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INTRODUCTION
This note examines complex litigation with the goal of providing
practical options for its management. It is written from a judge’s
perspective. While it does not consider problems unique to lawyers, such
as funding, document management, coordination with other counsel and so
on, it will arm lawyers with a sense of what at least some judges are trying
to do, or say they are trying to do. Lawyers, as well as judges, may find
useful the strategies discussed in the latter part of the note. Because
experiments in the complex area may spread to other cases,2 the issues
noted here may be of interest outside the complex arena. And this note
may also be useful to those outside the law interested to see how complex
mechanisms actually play out in the legal context.
As I say, I have tried for a practical approach. I borrow and cite from
academic literature as useful, but no more. As many have noted, there is a
divergence between the interests of academia and the needs of the courts
and practicing lawyers,3 and I work here for the latter crowd.
I have been inspired by work in the field—or fields—of complexity
theory, but I claim no more than inspiration. As with complex systems,
litigation (1) is made up of pieces: parties, motions, pleadings, arguments,
and so on; (2) is a function of generally deterministic rules; (3) generates
systems with emergent attributes, not just extrapolations of their elements;
and (4) leads to unpredictable results. Litigation has complex feedback
loops, may suffer from tight coupling, and can be defined (or at least

2. See generally Jay Tidmarsh, Civil Procedure: The Last Ten Years, 46 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 503 (1996) (discussing trends in civil procedure).
3. See, e.g., James L. Oakes, Commentary on Judge Edwards’ “Growing Disjunction
Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession”, 91 MICH. L. REV. 2163 (1993)
(discussing the teaching of legal ethics); Bryan A. Garner, Interview of Chief Justice John
G.
Roberts,
Jr.,
13
SCRIBES
J.
LEG.
WRITING
5,
37
(2010),
http://legaltimes.typepad.com/files/garner-transcripts-1.pdf,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/Y32H-BS99 (“I think it’s extraordinary these days—the tremendous
disconnect between the legal academy and the legal profession. They occupy two different
universes. What the academy is doing, as far as I can tell, is largely of no use or interest to
people who actually practice law. Whether it’s analytic, whether it’s at whatever level
they’re operating, it doesn’t help the practitioners or help the judges.”)
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analyzed) by the flow of information from one piece or phase to the next—
these are features of many complex systems. I will discuss these features
below. But this is still all analogy, and I will use it just as long as it is
useful.4
And it is useful, I think, as an aid in the diagnosis of the problems of
complex litigation. It is easy to think either that all complex litigation
shares common attributes (many parties and issues, frequent trips to the
courtroom) pointing us to a series of common approaches (frequent case
management conferences, informal discovery conferences); or that every
case is unique, and needs an entirely improvised attack. Neither of these is
correct. There are patterns. Complexity theory inspires a review of
problems and argues their categorization; it helps us focus on the animating
features of a case, and so in turn helps us manage it as efficiently, and
fairly, as we can. Medicine has its differential diagnosis, a process by
which the symptoms are collected, and used to identify the disease. Some
diseases have similar symptoms, but (we hope) not all the symptoms are
features of more than one disease. Diseases repeat, and if we know their
symptoms, we can diagnose. So too, as we look to the features of various
complex cases, we can isolate the animating aspects and target our efforts
appropriately, treating the right condition and avoiding judicial control that
will not, actually, help.
4. That is, it doesn’t matter whether the law, or a part of it, or its processes, really are
or are not complex systems. Compare, e.g., Carla Crandall, If You Can’t Beat Them, Kill
Them: Complex Adaptive Systems Theory and the Rise in Targeted Killing, 43 SETON HALL
L. REV. 595, 608 (2013) (“[M]uch of the complexity associated with complex adaptive
systems derives from the fact that these systems are comprised of various interrelated and
interdependent agents of components. So it is with the legal system.”), with R. George
Wright, The Illusion of Simplicity: An Explanation of Why the Law Can’t Just Be Less
Complex, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 715, 744 (1999-2000) (“Ultimately, the law is as simple or
as complex as it is, in whatever respect, because that degree of simplicity or complexity is
consistent with the current, broad balance of legal and political forces.”), and D. Bourcier, et
al., Toward Measures Of Complexity In Legal Systems, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 11TH INT’L
CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & LAW, 211 (2007), http://portal.acm.org/
citation.cfm?id=1276359, archived at http://perma.cc/4N9T-CVCZ (noting that describing
the legal system as a complex system is “at best inspired by some analogy with
characterizations of complex systems in mathematics, physics or ecology” and proposing
the development of a “structure-based” measure and “content-based” measure to measure
the complexities of the legal system). See generally Jeffrey Rudd, J.B. Ruhl’s “Law-andSociety System”: Burying Norms and Democracy Under Complexity Theory’s Foundation,
29 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 551, 551-52 & n.2 (2005) (discussing the
problems that plague the modern regulatory state). Some academic material is helpful in
mapping out the sorts of complexities (in the less technical sense) that affect the law but
their recommendations are too vague to be useful to lawyers and judges. See, e.g., Peter H.
Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, And Cures, 42 DUKE L.J. 1 (1992)
(defining a complex legal system as one whose rules, processes, institutions and supporting
culture have density, technicality, differentiation, and indeterminacy).
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In Section II, I review the definition of a “complex” case and isolate
and explain its emphasis on the need for a judge to manage the case.
Section III provides a brief description of complex systems generally,
offering a series of characteristics that help, at least by analogy, analyze
complex litigation. I use Section IV to argue that the focus of the court’s
work in complex cases should be on settlement, and I introduce the notion
of the early inflection point as a point, or points, in the life of a case—short
of trial—where settlement is reasonable. Section V uses two fictional cases
to rough out the essential, and striking, differences between simple and
complex cases, and in so doing begins the process of mapping out just what
it is that makes a case complex. I break Section VI into two parts, each
addressing a series of specific characteristics or aspects (symptoms, one
might say) of complex cases, explaining how these affect the progress of
the case. Then in Section VII, I explore the many tools and techniques
judges have to manage and ameliorate the aspects and characteristics of
complex cases. Section VIII concludes with a last look at the distinction
between “outlier” and “core” issues as a general guide-post to the work of a
complex judge.
I.

DEFINITION OF COMPLEX CASE

The definition of a “complex” case is not just an academic exercise.
In its identification of characteristics, it leads us to useful management
techniques.
I, of course, first turned to the state rules and had intended to mock
them, just a little, as tautological. For purposes of deciding when to assign
cases to a complex judge, the rules define a complex case as one that
requires such a judge:
A “complex case” is an action that requires exceptional judicial
management to avoid placing unnecessary burdens on the court
or the litigants and to expedite the case, keep costs reasonable,
and promote effective decision making by the court, the parties,
and counsel.5
The factors suggestive of a need for such a judge are these:
“(1) Numerous pretrial motions raising difficult or novel legal
issues that will be time-consuming to resolve; (2) Management of
a large number of witnesses or a substantial amount of

5. CAL. R. CT. 3.400(a). For a short history of the events that led to the creation of the
complex courts in California, see Mitchell L. Bach, et al., A History of the Creation and
Jurisdiction of Business Courts in the Last Decade, 60 BUS. LAW. 147, 206 (2004)
(discussing the creation of specialized business courts in the United States).
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documentary evidence; (3) Management of a large number of
separately represented parties; (4) Coordination with related
actions pending in one or more courts in other counties, states, or
countries, or in a federal court; or (5) Substantial post judgment
judicial supervision.”6
All this is not quite a tautology, for it comes to rest on the rationale for
complex designation: the need for judicial intervention. This is a
recognition that the usual rules—and in California, we have a lot of them,
from legislatively-prescribed discovery procedures, rules of court, a code of
civil procedure, and laws found in other codes as well—won’t work. The
typical self-enforcement mechanisms of discovery, even augmented by
discovery motions, and the economic incentives of the parties to get to trial
or settle, won’t work. Left to their own devices, the lawyers, operating in
the interests of their clients as they are meant to do, will create vast
inefficiencies both for themselves and the court which ultimately tries the
case. Professor Tidmarsh identifies the pertinent “dysfunctions,” and the
consequent need for judicial intervention: “The hypothesis of
complexity . . . holds that an essential attribute of complex litigation is
lawyer, factfinder, or party dysfunction remediable by an assertion of
judicial power . . . .”7
This insight meshes with that extracted from complexity theory: a
complex system in effect takes on a life of its own, an unpredictable and
sometimes dangerous life of its own. External supervision is required to
prevent this. I briefly develop the complex systems analogy below, Section
III.
In the usual case, lawyers run the whole show up to trial. Judges only

6. CAL. R. CT. 3.400(b). The definition often includes these sorts of cases: class
actions, securities fraud, mass tort, construction defect, insurance coverage with multiple
policies, construction defect, and multi-party cases generally.
7. Jay Tidmarsh, Unattainable Justice: The Form of Complex Litigation and the
Limits of Judicial Power, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1683, 1789 (1992). See generally, Jack
Friedenthal, Tackling Complex Litigation, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1301, 1310 & n.20
(1999) (reviewing Jay Tidmarsh & Roger H. Trangsrud, COMPLEX LITIGATION AND THE
ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1998)). Tidmarsh exposes not just lawyer dysfunction, but also that
of (i) the jury as it tries to do its fact finding function in a complex case, Tidmarsh, supra, at
1766, and (ii) the parties, id. at 1773. See also Jay Tidmarsh, Looking Forward, 1 SEDONA
CONF. J. 1, 4 (2000) (stating that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures have revolutionized
thoughts about procedure). It is important to state that by “dysfunction” neither Professor
Tidmarsh nor I suggest disapproval or reproach. Rather, the suggestion is this: we
ordinarily expect the legitimate incentives and capabilities of parties, lawyers, juries and
others involved in a lawsuit together to produce justice, we might say, “the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.” FED. R. CIV. P. 1. To some
extent in many cases, but in particular in complex cases, that expectation is insupportable
(absent the judicial intervention discussed in this note).
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decide when an issue is offered up at the instigation of and on timing set by
the parties. The primary job of the judge is to decide legal issues. An
example of a mundane motion may help distinguish this usual case from
the complex one. In the usual case, there is no stay of discovery and if on
the rare occasion one is sought, it is by way of noticed motion. That’s
about three to four weeks’ notice of hearing, moving, opposition, and reply
papers, supported by declarations and often authenticated exhibits, and then
oral argument. In large metropolitan areas, the motion will probably cost
thousands of dollars to brief and argue. In a complex case, there may be
reasons to stop and start discovery, to phase it, to have some but not all
issues subject to discovery; handling these request in the usual way would
be, to put it as mildly as I can, inefficient. So these issues are often handled
at case management conferences, or a phone call; perhaps five minutes, and
no filings, may be needed.
That most common of beasts, the demurrer, provides another simple
example. In a routine case, the demurer is filed, ruled on, leave to amend
may be given, a new complaint is filed and perhaps is then subject to
another demurrer. The judge simply rules on these as they come. In more
complicated cases, different parties come into the case at different times
and may file demurrers to different versions of the complaint; rulings as to
one may be moot or conflict with rulings as to another. In these situations
the judge must interfere, stop the uncoordinated filings, and synchronize all
demurrers to be heard at the same time.8
Below in Section V, I provide a more detailed contrast between the
simple and complex case. Here, I only note the key distinction: the
interventionist role of the judge in the complicated case as a result of the
failure of the usual rules of procedure and the inefficiencies of the usual
roles of the participants. This distinction defines the complex case.
Judges in complex cases also have a concomitant role: reducing the
special types of uncertainty that complex cases exhibit. Uncertainty is a
principal cost of complexity.
Of courses, all cases have uncertainty built into them.9 Disputed facts,
8. Complexity in this sense is a creature of trial courts, not appellate courts. This sort
of complexity is a function of the intersection between the law (court opinions and statutes)
and the practicalities of its implementation, which are rarely considered in any detail by the
appellate courts and the legislature, although the issues are often considered by those
drafting the statewide and local rules of court.
9. Quite aside from our intuitions about this, it may be formally (i.e., inevitably) true
as well. See Hillel Bavli, Note, Applying the Laws of Logic to the Logic of Laws, 33
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 937 (2005) (“[A]pplication of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem to the
legal context would establish a priori limitations on the capacity for consistency to exist
within the law, as well as on the faculty to establish internal logical consistency within the
law.”).
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conflicting ways to apply the law to the facts, ranges of potential damages
(such as for pain and suffering and punitive damages), whether the jury will
believe a key witnesses—all these, and more, make even the simplest case
uncertain and so susceptible to a range of reasonable settlement values.
Increasing complexity makes this worse:
As the complexity of legal regulation has grown, predicting the
outcome of adjudication in such cases has become more difficult. Law has
become “more indeterminate,” in the sense that litigants and judges “have
less faith that legal doctrine provides a single right answer.”10
In a complex case, prediction within any plausible range may be
impossible. This is often true as the case begins, if for example a theory
new to the law is pled, the potential liability of a host of defendants is
utterly unclear (and so their proportionate liability), or the facts are so
many and so dense it is not clear any trial can ever handle them. In some
cases (such as mass torts) the threat of defendants’ bankruptcy, the
uncertain interplay of overlapping insurance policies, the potential impact
of related litigation,11 or other overarching issues may make it impossible to
rely on a traditional evaluation of a case. Obviated here is the conceit that
litigation will, if properly processed, reach the “right” result as if it were a
foreordained truth (like the guilt or innocence of a criminal defendant, or
the truth of who, in a car accident case, ran the red light). The “right”
result in many cases, and certainly in many complex cases, will be the
consequence of bargaining, influenced perhaps heavily by court decisions,
many of which will be on the tumultuous edge of developing law, but also
by extra-legal concerns such as reputation, available resources and
opportunity costs, and so on.
But there is more. Parties and lawyers believe that the other side will
play off the infinite intricacies of procedural law, designed to produce a fair
substantive result, to undermine a fair result. Parties know that complexity
encourages the pursuit of outlier issues, it can slow down litigation,
refocusing on procedural disputes (the resolution of which is unlikely to
change a party’s views on a reasonable settlement) and away from
substantive disputes (the resolution of which should propel parties towards
settlement). This, in turn, increases uncertainty and decreases faith that
settlement will reflect the “true” value of the case.
Parties in complex cases do have a powerful resistance to reaching the

10. John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial in the United States, 122
YALE L.J. 522, 558 (2012) (quoting Marc Galanter, “. . . A Settlement Judge, Not a Trial
Judge:” Judicial Mediation in the United States, 12 J.L. SOC’Y 1, 14 (1985)).
11. Findings in other case may have a preclusive effect in the present case under
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. These doctrines may block (or “preclude”)
litigation of issues already decided in another case.
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merits too early; the tendency is to pause, search the whole terrain for
possibly useful facts, investigate each potentially useful theory, and only
then gingerly approach the merits. The stakes are high; the issues are
many, some unprecedented; caution is the watchword. There may be
serious uncertainty as to exactly what the issues are, and so how to cabin
discovery and other aspects of the case.12 It is child’s play to demand or
produce an overwhelming number of documents, depositions or
interrogatories, to file weak motions, to condition progress in the case on
other events such as litigation in other jurisdictions, to interpose (and
invent) myriad claims and defenses, bring in other entities as cross
defendants or at least the targets of discovery subpoenas. Some of this is
bad behavior, but much of it is not.
These complex procedures result in uncertainty, perpetuated by delay.
Judges can ameliorate this.
II.

COMPLEX SYSTEMS

I do not insist that complex litigation is “complex” in the technical
sense, but at the risk of conflating the two uses of the term, I have thought
it useful to briefly outline the usual characteristics of complex systems.
The analogy is useful, and my outline of specific types of complex cases at
Section VI will borrow from this, as well as providing a visceral feel for the
sorts of uncertainty lurking in complex cases. In turn, this analogy will
help explain some of the solutions mapped out in Section VII.
Complex systems include population dynamics, weather and the
turbulent flow of a river or stream, the brain’s electrical activity, evolution,
some computer expert systems (i.e. software which generates expert
opinions), financial markets, the immune system, the internet, and so on.13
Their basic architecture is a network of elements which together function in
ways not directly predicable from the behavior of the elements as such,
although at the same time the action of the elements as such may be wholly

12. See Keith Broyles, Taking the Courtroom into the Classroom: A Proposal for
Educating the Lay Juror in Complex Litigation Cases, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 714, 720
(1996) (quoting Tidmarsh, supra note 8).
13. M. E. J. Newman, Complex Systems: A Survey, 79 AM. J. PHYS. 800 (2011); see
Melanie Mitchell, COMPLEXITY: A GUIDED TOUR 12-13 (2009) (discussing the
commonalities among complex systems when examined at a higher level of generality).
Complicated systems are not necessarily complex. Complicated may just mean many parts,
say, reviewing a dozen elements and fifteen sub-elements to see if all elements of a cause of
action have been proved. Complex systems include a lot of moving parts, i.e. parts which
affect each other in unpredictable ways, as outlined in the text. Outside of this section
where I introduce the technical sense of “complex,” I will not keep the two terms strictly
distinct.
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deterministic. Fluid dynamics, which studies fluids such as turbulent water
as well as the weather, provides a straightforward example. The behavior
of the elements, such as air or water molecules, as affected by their
environments (which might be constraints such as earth and stones) is
determined; any given movement is, in isolation, predictable and governed
by the immutable law of physics. But the overall patterns of the turbulent
river or weather are unpredictable. Rather, they can be approximated, and
the odds of a given configuration might be calculable, but the actions of the
overall system cannot be, practically, calculated, and the overall system has
fundamental descriptors that are not descriptions of the constituent
elements. This higher-level set of characteristics is sometimes referred to
as emergent. For example, one might say of a body that it is beautiful, or
of a brain that it is smart, but these terms would not be useful in describing
a cell or synapse. Beauty and intelligence are emergent qualities.
In complex systems, the components influence each other in many
ways. They influence each other reciprocally (so that elements A and B
influence each other), collectively (A and B together influence C, which
may then influence A), differently (A’s influence on C is high, while B’s
influence is low) and divergently (A inhibits C, but B encourages C). Each
of these elements (A, B, C) may be made up of constituents; that is, some
complex systems are systems of systems. The brain is a fair example of all
of these sorts of interactions. Neurons interact with each other: many will
influence one, and that one may be part of a group that influences the
former set; some neurons inhibit, and others excite, the cells to which they
are connected; and so on.
We commonly see in complex systems: (a) complicated feedback
loops that can act as sophisticated information processing schemes and (b)
no central control—that is, as indicated, the emergent behavior is the result
of the amalgam of elements, not of a supervisory module. Some complex
systems give rise to adaptive behavior; that is, they change according to the
environment. Evolution itself is of course the prime example, but to some
extent one sees this in the flocking behavior of birds, ant colonies, financial
markets, cities, and expert systems.
Finally, some complex systems are highly sensitive to changes in
initial conditions, or indeed subsequent inputs, and these decisive inputs
may not be perceptible, and their impact may not be predicable (although it
may be discerned after the fact). The term “chaotic” may be applied to
describe this feature. Very slight changes in the speed and direction of
water molecules may create profoundly different patterns, including the
transition from non-turbulent to turbulent conditions. Local weather is
highly dependent on slight changes in conditions, and slight changes in the
number of prey or food sources may have catastrophic impacts on
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populations.
For a visceral view of this, consider traffic: a small (but unpredictably
small) number of extra cars on the road transforms a smooth trip to the stop
and start behavior of commute hours. The smallest variation in billiards—
the speed of the cue’s strike, the precise point and angle at which the ball is
hit—may make an enormous difference to the movement.
I summarize the relevant aspects of complex systems. First, knowing
everything there is to know about the composition, the elements, or the
parts is not enough to predict the behavior of the whole, and this is even
more so when the whole system changes over time, adapting to new
conditions. Second, there is no central control. Third, concomitantly, the
behavior of complex systems may be unpredictable, and very small
changes, including changes we do not register as such, can have a
significant impact.
III.

MANAGING CASES TOWARDS SETTLEMENT

Most cases settle. The odds of a complex case settling are even
higher.14 Thus the judge’s time is best spent managing cases towards
settlement. This obviously also involves trial preparation, for the case may
end up there, but usually the critical trial-related preparation is that which
plainly alerts the parties to the value of the case, and so brings settlement
closer.
Since the case will likely terminate with settlement, the central issue
is: What must be done to get to settlement? Judges should at least allude to
this at each case management conference. In most cases, settlement is
furthered by reducing uncertainty to such an extent that the parties do not
think it worthwhile to continue litigation. Phrased this way, we can
14. See Complex Litigation: Key Findings from the California Pilot Program, 3 NAT’L
CTR. FOR ST. CT.’S, CIVIL ACTION, Winter 2004, at 4 (describing the likelihood of complex
cases settling). Very few class actions go to trial. See CALIFORNIA ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE
OF THE COURTS, FINDINGS OF THE STUDY OF CALIFORNIA CLASS ACTION LITIGATION, 20002006 at 11-12 (2009), http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/class-action-lit-study.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/8HLA-ZTZ6 (“This analysis highlights another unique trait of
class action litigation in that class action cases very rarely proceed through trial to a verdict.
Only seven-tenths of one percent of cases in the sample ended in a trial verdict, and, of
these, only two cases reached trial with a certified class. This is considerably lower than the
8.6% average trial disposition rate for all unlimited civil cases in the study courts over the
same time period”). See Peter H. Schuck, Judicial Avoidance of Juries in Mass Tort
Litigation, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 479, 486-87 (1998) (“The asymmetric incentives and the risk
aversion exhibited by mass tort plaintiffs (and their lawyers) and by mass tort defendants
evidently exert a powerful gravitational pull away from trials and toward settlement
despite—or perhaps because of—the enormous legal, factual, and procedural uncertainties
surrounding these cases”).
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generate a paradox: litigation should be costless—friction free. For surely
costly time-consuming litigation is bad. On the other hand, costless
litigation means we may never reach the point where settlement makes
sense. To be sure, litigation would still stop when one side was offered at
least as much as it thought it might win at trial. But for the other side to
settle, the parties must either suffer from an asymmetry of information such
that settlement at a certain dollar figure is seen as favorable to both sides,
or they must be so close to both symmetrical information and perfect
information (i.e. both sides have virtually all of the information there is,
and it is (of course) the same information. I call this the “perfect case”)
that merely the waste of time of continuing what is otherwise costless
litigation is enough to convince them to settle. Practically, these latter
situations do not exist: parties almost never have the same (symmetric)
information, and never perfect information, because the latter must include
knowing, for example, the make-up of the jury, how the court will exercise
discretion in each decision, and so on. It requires being able to foretell the
future.
Entirely costless litigation, therefore, is not possible (litigation takes
time if nothing else) nor is desirable. The cost of litigation expands the
settlement range making it reasonable to factor in the cost of litigation and
so augment the range of reasonable settlements. So, for example, if
litigation costs $10, and plaintiff expects to win $50, then any settlement
from $41 and up is good. A converse calculation may be made for
defendant: if her costs too are $10, then any settlement costing $9 or less is
good. When the odds of prevailing and a likely verdict are factored in, a
range can be generated of settlements which are good for both sides, and
that is the point: unlike settlement of a perfect case, which has a single
point for reasonable settlement (and equals the actual result after full
litigation), real cases with imperfect information have a range. That range
is the settlement envelope.15
15. This has also been described as a “surplus” the parties can divide to create a
reasonable outcome. See, e.g., Leandra Lederman, Which Cases Go to Trial?: An Empirical
Study of Predictors of Failure to Settle, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 315, 319-20 (1999)
(describing as “surplus,” the total costs saved had the parties in a particular case settled
rather than take the matter to trial). For more on settlement envelopes and how they are
affected by various strategies, see Curtis Karnow, Conflicts of Interest and Institutional
Litigants, 32 J. LEGAL PROF. 7 (2008) (discussing how the settlement strategies of
institutional litigants serve long-term priorities at the expense of short-term, seemingly
irrational settlement agreements). Early settlement is preferred to late settlement; among
other reasons, because the settlement envelope shrinks as fees and costs are expended.
Costs become sunk, and the $10 in the text shrinks to $8, $3, and so on. See generally
Curtis
Karnow,
Timing
Settlement
(2011),
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1006&context=curtis_karnow,
archived at http://perma.cc/KF5Z-QW37 (offering a brief survey of empirical studies
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But note this: if the parties do not think they have a perfect case (and
they never do), then each knows, by definition, that the other side might
accept a less favorable (to the other party) settlement than the one the first
party is about to accept. This is the fear of “leaving something on the
table.” So if plaintiff knows defendant is willing to offer $X, then plaintiff
also has reason to think that something better than $X might be possible.
Every settlement of an imperfect case (and that means every actual case)
risks leaving something on the table (unless and until a credible ultimate
“bottom line” figure is offered).
The trick then is not precisely to make litigation costless, even if that
were feasible. It is to get to a certain point in the litigation where
settlement is reasonable, and to get there as fast and as cost-free as
possible, but for the subsequent costs to be relatively high. I will call that
point the inflection point. An unfortunate instance of this is what actually
happens in the real world. The moment before trial is often seen as the
inflection point. Lawyers and parties seem willing to spend whatever it
takes to get to trial, but fear trial itself as both a decisive and very
expensive moment in the case. Thus it is that so many cases settle just
before trial (“on the courthouse steps,” as the legal wags have it).16 This
standard model is lousy, but it survives because it lives off a classic
cognitive fallacy: compressed costs and risks are noticed more than when
they are spread out. We notice (and fear) the airplane crash in which 250
people are killed at the same instant, and ignore the 250 people killed at
railway crossings each year. As with cost, so too risk: we attend closely to
the compressed risk of a single investment with a 50% chance of going
bad, but perhaps ignore the risks of gambling over a multi-year period with
a similar risk of loss. So, too, we figure the costs of trial, in time and
money, but often fail to map out the pretrial work in identifiable, and
priced, chunks. In any event, working towards an inflection point
substantially earlier than trial–an early inflection point (“EIP”) I will term
it–is difficult because the moment before trial remains a competing
inflection point, and because the moment before trial remains symbolically
the moment when the parties are closest to perfect and symmetrical
information—closest to the perfect case. That, in turn, means (if the parties
are drinking their own Kool-Aid) that it is not until just before trial that a
settlement is most likely not to leave anything on the table, which in turn is
taken to mean that it is just before trial that one is most likely to get the best
settlement. That estimate of perfect timing is fallacious in many cases (this
regarding how best to time mandatory settlement conferences).
16. See generally Andrew J. Wistrich et al., How Lawyers’ Intuitions Prolong
Litigation, 86 S. CA. L. REV. 571, 571 (2013) (discussing why many cases do not settle until
the eve of trial, or “on the courthouse steps”).
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is the Kool-Aid) because it does not account for: (1) the now sunk costs of
arriving at that “perfect” moment; (2) the fact that events since what could
have been an EIP might have made things worse on the merits for at least
one of the parties; (3) the moment before trial is only the roughest proxy
for a perfect case, because much uncertainty still remains, and as we will
see in complex cases, always remains.17
So we arrive at the basic question for the court: how do we help the
parties quickly reach an EIP? How do we make it as cheap and fast as
possible to get to this point with the threat of relatively great expense and
risk thereafter? That is the problem. There is something difficult, or
complex about the case that blocks the parties from reaching an EIP, a
point at which much material information is shared, but (obviously)
uncertainty still remains. A case that is close, but not too close, to a perfect
case; indeed, as far back (at least in time) from a perfect case as we can
manage; where we have resolved just enough of the uncertainty.
I propose an inventory of these types of impediments—the
characteristics of what we might call “complex” cases, and other cases.
These are what in a general way make cases “hard.” It is important to tease
these out because there are different solutions to different conditions.
Taking a metaphor from medicine, we examine a case and create a
differential diagnosis, a list of attributes that suggests the problem to be
solved and the remedy to employ.
IV.

EXEMPLARS: SIMPLE AND COMPLEX (COMPLICATED) CASES

But first let us gain some insight into what makes cases hard by
contrasting a simple and a complex case.
The “simple” case is a small drug possession case. The officer saw
the defendant jaywalking, detained him, says he was given consent to
search the man’s backpack, and found a small amount of drugs. It is a
misdemeanor. In contrast to what we may call a complex case, this
misdemeanor case has the following characteristics: there are at most a
couple of fact issues such as the credibility of the arresting officer, which
will likely dictate the results of the suppression hearing as well as the jury
verdict. The credibility of the defendant might be at stake, but probably
not, as he is unlikely to testify. In a rare case, the nature of the drugs (or
perhaps their quantity) might be at issue. There are a few legal issues such
as the standards under the Fourth Amendment for a detention, and whether
the defendant’s words and actions really were tantamount to consent
17. In class actions, we have an EIP just as the certification motion is being filed. The
stakes are so high in such a motion that parties frequently parlay the uncertainty of a result
into settlement.
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(assuming the officer is telling the truth). There might be an issue whether
there was a prejudicial delay in the prosecution, requiring a speedy trial
analysis, but probably not. The lawyers and the judge in this case have
done all this before: previous fact patterns have been almost identical, and
the legal issues are, in fact, identical to those in prior cases. The outcomes
available in this case are very limited: the defendant will either be acquitted
or found guilty, and although there are of course many variations among
locales—and it may depend on whether he pleads out or is convicted by the
jury—the sentence in the specific court is probably highly predictable:
there is, as one might say, a “market,” and the players (the judges and
lawyers) know the price for the crime. The simpler and more common the
crime, the better known the market, and thus the more predictable the
outcome.
What else can we say about this simple case? As a function of the
limited number of legal issues, which have been frequently visited in the
past, the law is stable. It is unlikely that a new appellate decision will need
to be reviewed. And as a function of this it is pretty clear what the line is
between issues where review will be de novo (such as on the legal issues
outlined above) and those area where the trial judge has discretion, such as
fact finding in the suppression hearing, sentencing within a given range,
and the usual evidentiary issues. In other words, it is generally clear what
type of decision is at stake, including the nature of the decision maker
(judge, jury), the factors to be considered, the nature of appellate review,
and thus the sort of record one is expected to make. Moreover, appellate
review will occur once: after judgment. It will probably be based on the
harmless error rule with the key trial determinations (the result of the
suppression hearing and the jury verdict) likely upheld as within the
discretion of those factfinders.18
The complex case (here I use the term “complex” in a non-technical
sense) is just the opposite of the misdemeanor. If the drug possession case
is typical of the simple matter, what is typical of the complex matter?
Nothing is, and that is the point. Each case is different from the next. Even
18. Of course, even this “simple” case may not be free of difficult problems for the
lawyers and the judge. Jury selection and maintenance raise a host of problems that must be
decided on the spot, such as bias in selection, detecting bias in the jurors, communications
among jurors and others, and simply managing the lives of all these people for a few days
can be stressful. Incompetent lawyers, or those who have decided the best tactic to is
antagonize the trial judge, defendants’ complaints about lawyers (competent or not) and
their sometime wishes to represent themselves, all contribute the difficulties of any criminal
trial, as do sometime difficult evidentiary issues. The trial of a “simple” misdemeanor can
easily be more difficult than that of a “complex” civil case. But these difficulties do not
affect the outcome in the sense that the prediction of these difficulties will not impact the
parties’ settlement posture.
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where the general area of law is the same—say insurance coverage or
securities fraud—the past is only the roughest guide to the present. We do
know this about complex cases: there will be many issues, perhaps from
problems with service in other states and nations, to jurisdiction and venue,
preemption, choice of law, anti-SLAPP motions, demurrers, motions to
strike, perhaps class certification issues, and often numerous hard fought
discovery motions—and all that long before the merits are seriously
addressed.19 The lawyers and the judge probably have not handled these
issues before. It may be that none of the decisive jury instructions is found
in the forms, and the lawyers and judge are very likely to be required to
read unfamiliar appellate opinions. Indeed, it is likely that a series of
significant legal questions are undecided so that the judge will find herself
constantly estimating the appropriate rules. This is another way of saying
the law may be unstable, even where the type of issue is common. For
example, complex cases may involve arbitration agreements, anti-SLAPP
motions, the reach and scope of a tort duty, or class certification issues.
These are frequently seen, but the law is uncertain in all those areas.
Preemption issues are notoriously difficult, not because the three types of
preemption are new,20 but because precedent provides only the most
general constraints. In some cases both the court and the jury must issue
decisions posing interesting timing and coordination problems. Even in a
relatively simple complex case, such as for insurance coverage with one
insurer, it might be unclear whether the issue is the interpretation of the
contract—and thus for the court to decide—or the determination of a fact—
for the jury to decide.21
19. It is understood that early procedures such as anti-SLAPP motions, TROs, and
preliminary injunctions will likely involve at least a preliminary estimate of the merits. See
CAL. CIV. PROC. § 425.16 (West 2015) (governing anti-SLAPP motions).
20. See Town of Atherton v. Cal. High-Speed Rail Auth., 175 Cal. Rptr. 3d 145, 159
(Ct. App. 2014) (“The United States Supreme Court has recognized three types of
preemption under the supremacy clause: express preemption, conflict preemption, and field
preemption.” (quoting People v. Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R., 148 Cal. Rptr. 3d 243, 248
(Ct. App. 2012)).
21. See generally Entin v. Superior Court, 146 Cal. Rptr. 3d 52, 56-57 (Ct. App. 2012)
(explaining that a litigant’s jury trial right can turn on whether the court determines the
matter is a declaratory relief action); Shopoff & Cavallo LLP v. Hyon, 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 268
(Ct. App. 2008) (holding that regardless of the nature of the specific claims, the matter is
still tried to the court, because it is an interpleader action); Oceanside 84, Ltd. v. Fid. Fed.
Bank, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 487 (Ct. App. 1997) (finding that when a court uses extrinsic
evidence used to a contract, the ultimate fact might require a jury, even if unnecessary in the
case); Walton v. Walton, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 901 (Ct. App. 1995) (discussing a contract case
that appears triable to a jury, but because specific performance is the requested remedy, the
case is instead tried to the court). Even when legal damages are one of the possible
remedies—a usual indicia of a right to a jury—a jury right might not attach, such as in an
action for accounting. De Guere v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 438, 454-
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Because multiple legal issues have a decisive impact, and some of
those are novel, the relationship between the trial and appellate courts is
different in complex civil cases than it is in, for example, simple criminal
cases. Some trial court determinations such as deciding anti-SLAPP
motions, or granting a motion to stay or dismiss on grounds of inconvenient
forum (or because service of summons was quashed22), issuing preliminary
injunctions,23 and denial of class certification24 are subject to a right to
appellate review, and the appellate courts are often asked to step in with a
writ on other issues where early intervention may avoid wasted time down
the road. The review is almost always on an issue of law and so is de
novo25 which in turn means the work done at the trial level is of little use to
the reviewing court, and so in those cases, all the work is in effect being
done twice. Some of these appellate interventions come with a heavy
price. Appeals take about 18 months26 and writs anywhere from very little
time, if the court summarily denies the petition, to probably about the same
time as appeals.27 When (as is usual) an appellate proceeding is issue55 (Ct. App. 1997) (demonstrating that even when legal damages is a possible remedy—a
usual indicia of a right to a jury—a jury right does not attach).
22. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 904.1(a)(3) (West 2015).
23. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 904.1(a)(6) (West 2015).
24. In re Baycol Cases I & II., 248 P.3d 681 (Cal. 2011).
25. The review is said to be “abuse of discretion” on class certification motions.
Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Superior Court, 273 P.3d 513, 521 (Cal. 2012). However, given the
nature of the issues on appeal, the scope of review is frequently more stringent than this
suggests. See generally JON B. EISENBERG ET AL., CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: CIVIL
APPEALS AND WRITS ¶ 8:225 (2015 ed. 2015) (discussing reversal of a class action
certification or settlement). For an interesting view on the relationship between federal trial
and appellate courts in complex cases, and an argument that there is insufficient review, see
Melissa A. Waters, Common Law Courts in an Age of Equity Procedure: Redefining
Appellate Review for the Mass Tort Era 80, N.C. L. REV. 527 (2002) (explaining the
historical reasons for the imbalance of power between trial and appellate courts, as well as
their consequences for mass tort litigation).
26. The range differs in the various California courts. From time of filing to
disposition, it varies from the third division of the Fourth District with an average of 393
days to the Third District in Sacramento which has an average of 607 days. The state
median is 469 days. But a given case can take much, much longer. In the courts just cited,
90% of the cases are disposed of, respectively, in 575 days, 973 days, and 742 days (state
median). To rephrase, if one is in Third District and the case is in the top 10% of timeconsuming cases, it will take over two and half years to process. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF
CAL., Statewide Caseload Trends 1, 28 (2014),://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/2014Court-Statistics-Report.pdf., archived at http://perma.cc/F826-GGKUhttp
27. The time for writs is not published, and I have simply assumed that a fully briefed
and argued writ proceeding, which results in a full opinion, may take about the same time as
an appeal. A retired state justice has suggested to me this is roughly right although in my
experience the time period is often shorter for a writ. In the First District, which is one of
the faster appellate courts in the state, in 2013 on interlocutory writs, there were 22 written
opinions and 310 matters disposed of without written opinion. In 2012, there were 13
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dispositive it will for that reason define the contours of pretrial preparation
including discovery. This makes it difficult, and sometimes impossible, to
continue with the case in a coordinated fashion while the appellate
proceedings are pending.28
In most civil cases, not to speak of complex ones, there is a very wide
variety of possible outcomes: compensatory damages can of course vary
from zero29 to whatever it is the plaintiff seeks, and worse, if punitive or
emotional distress damages may be available (whether they are in fact or
not), or attorneys’ fees, the outcome is even less predictable. Depending on
the case, the possible outcomes for injunctive relief may be few, or many.
There is no “market” for this case because it is very likely one of a kind; as
I say, the lawyers [and the judge] have not seen it before. But now I mean
this here also in a stronger sense, because most complex litigators have a
very limited trial experience. Unlike their colleagues in the criminal courts,
and with some exceptions, civil litigators rarely try cases. It really is sui
generis for them. This poses its own series of problems, some of which I
will allude to later.
Finally, I note two further related contrasts between the simple
criminal and a complex (or indeed any) civil one. First, with rare
exceptions, a criminal case will terminate based on the merits (and I am
indeed assuming that a plea bargain is based on the merits, i.e. on the
strength of the prosecutor’s case30). The exceptions have to do with, e.g.,
the relatively rare suppression of evidence by the court, Brady violations,
or perhaps a statute of limitations or speedy trial problem. This is not
necessarily so in civil cases where (unlike criminal cases) there is a risk
that funds will not be available to take the case all the way through. In
short, the monetary cost of litigation is a serious factor in the life of a civil
case in a way it is not in criminal cases.31 Once a criminal case
written opinions and 280 disposed of without opinions. Id. at 33. That is, written opinions
were provided in 2013 in about 0.07% of the cases, and in 2012 the figure was 0.04%.
28. Obviously an appeal severely limits what a trial court can do, CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 916 (West 2015), but I mean something more here. First, when an appeal involves
some but not all parties, it is at least conceivable that a judge might opt to delay matters as
to the parties not covered by the appeal so that a reversal will not require the wholesale
duplication of effort. And although they need not do so, trial judges may opt to delay
pending a writ proceeding, and especially when the appellate panel has requested briefing
(which shows serious interest in the issue).
29. Actually, they vary down to below zero: plaintiffs may be stuck with costs and
attorney’s fees of the other side. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 998, 1033.5 (West 2015).
30. But see Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead Guilty, THE N.Y. REVIEW OF
BOOKS (November 2014), http://www.nybooks. com/articles/archives/2014/nov/20/whyinnocent-people-plead-guilty/, archived at http://perma.cc/M2NV-33VU (explaining why
innocent people take plea bargains).
31. To be sure, prosecutors have their priorities, and cannot take every case; and
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commences, it would be bizarre if it were to resolve based on the fact that
one party or the other was about to run out of funds. But that possibility
lurks in every civil case. It is a potent source of uncertainty and creates a
potent pressure point for settlement.
This leads to a second contrast. As noted just above, in civil cases,
there is a threat to both sides; there is always a cost to a side even when the
side is confident in victory. In civil cases, this risk can be augmented by
the cross complaint, which has the effect of multiplying the uncertainty of
outcomes. I do not mean just cross complaints against the plaintiff
although that can be plenty destabilizing: the defendant may be able to
bring in a plethora of other parties and, in so doing, vastly increase the
stakes, the costs, and uncertainty. This routinely happens in construction
defect cases which might start out with a plaintiff homeowner suing the
general contractor, who then in turn brings in all possible subcontractors as
cross defendants. Of course, these risks do not obtain in criminal trials.32
The result is, as is intuitively obvious, that the result in complex civil
cases is difficult to predict. I have belabored the obvious because I wish to
tease out and discuss the specific types of problems that make outcomes in
complex civil cases difficult to predict, and in turn difficult to settle early
(i.e. at an EIP).
For the judge, a complex civil case is not just more work than a simple
case, it is different work. For example, judges handling a misdemeanor
drug case are by and large trial judges and all their decisions are made in
the context of trial. Complex civil judges may go for years without a jury
trial: their work is management and motions.
V.

ASPECTS OF COMPLEX CASES

For convenience I have divided comments here into two parts,
although some discussion under one might easily have been categorized
under the other. The first part looks at a few of the animating forces which
may be found in any case and more so in complex cases. As the subtitle
suggests, I think of these not so much as good descriptions of a type of
case—I discuss that in the second part—but rather specific mechanisms
which create difficulties. The second part roughly maps a sort of taxonomy
of complex cases, calling out their aspects and the reasons why they are
complex. Each of these discussions aims to explain why judicial
neither they nor defense counsel have the resources to undertake every possible pretrial
investigation.
32. Certainly there are very complicated criminal trials, especially with multiple
defendants, gang allegations, and difficult issues of confession admissibility. In the text, I
am still contrasting the simple criminal case with the complex civil case.
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intervention is helpful—or required.
A. Catalysts, Inhibitors and Other Mechanisms
1.

Outliers & The Edge Problem

All legal issues have edges (or, if we were writing in the 1960s,
“penumbras”33), where the signal to noise ratio shifts from high to low.
Especially during pretrial work such as discovery (but also at trial), not
every minute is spent precisely on topic. Lawyers understandably have
concerns with impeachment, background and context. We also see
deliberate attempts to misdirect, an unsettled grip on [or straight-out
misunderstanding of] issues, as well as the deep desire of most lawyers to
account for each possibility and leave no stone unturned. These
investigations all lie at the “edge,” or border of core legal issues, and they
threaten to confound and derail a case. These are the black holes of
discovery, and where juries go mad listening to what seems to be
extraneous nattering at trial. In motion practice, it is these issues which
lead to the sometimes unauthorized filing of sur-replies and replies to surreplies, requests to impeach impeaching witnesses, notices of depositions to
those who wrote book reviews of books on which experts rely. Lawyers’
automatic, reflexive tendency in this direction is neatly summarized in the
classic introduction to most document demands: “Produce any and all
documents which refer, constitute, reflect or otherwise relate to [insert
issue]. . .” Every word in a contract could be deemed ambiguous and if so
its every use by every person involved in the contracting process might
be—if at some far distant remove—relevant. Every witness has a history,
and some events from those histories might relate to her credibility; every
narrative of deceit, misconduct, malpractice or other offense has tentacles
ranging back in time and outwards to other people and events—which
might all be documented and ripe for exploration. These are the edges of
the core issues, the outlier issues.
Every core issue has many such edges, and many issues may generate
a very large number of edges which in turn may swamp consideration of
the core issues. Complex cases have many of these outliers,34 and as
33. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
34. See, e.g., Michelle J. White, Legal Complexity and Lawyers’ Benefit from
Litigation,
12
INT’L
REV.
L.
&
ECON.
381,
382
(1992),
http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/handle/2027.42/29878, archived at http://perma.cc/M7BG4QRA (“Legal complexity is defined here in terms of the amount of information that must
be collected and processed in order for lawyers to evaluate a case and litigation to proceed.
For example, a statute that is vaguely worded is more complex than one that is clearly
worded, since when the statute is vague, lawyers need to consult additional sources of
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described below, parties in these cases have the means and motives to
pursue them.
2.

Friction

Friction is the cost of doing business: the transaction costs. It is the
reason there are no perpetual motion machines; it is the second law of
thermodynamics. In litigation, it is the cost of getting things done, whether
it is the cost in time of picking up the phone for a meet and confer, the
price of an expensive summary judgment motion, privilege logs with a
thousand entries, or flying to Denver for a deposition. Obviously friction
goes up with complexity: it may take a minute to arrange a conference call
with one lawyer, and weeks to get it done among twenty lawyers; and
because counsel are expected to confer and coordinate on every discovery
motion, hearing schedules and depositions, joint case management
conferences, demurrers (motions to dismiss), mediations, and much else,
this friction is significant. Friction rises rapidly with the number of
lawyers, parties and issues (see the Edge Problem).35
Almost all the procedural rules in the rules of court and California’s
Code of Civil Procedure, as well as local rules and individual judges’
guidelines, were originally designed to reduce friction. They set defaults,
sometimes inflexible defaults, in order to avoid having as it were to
reinvent the wheel in every case. It would be beyond exhausting if in each
case everything from the number of lines per page and how to secure
judicial notice, to the format and timing of motions had to be negotiated or
argued and decided by the judge. Some devices, like a separate statement
of undisputed facts (or format for objections) in summary judgment
motions, or a separate statement in discovery motions, are required because
they make issues easier to decide. Having rules and defaults allows the
parties and judges to spend their time on substantive matters.36
information for clarification. Legal rules that involve additional tests are more complex,
since each extra test requires that additional evidence be collected and evaluated”).
35. As every lawyer knows, transaction costs rise rapidly in complex litigation also
because discovery is very expensive, a function of the fact that documents, including
massive amounts of electronic documents, may be sought by the parties. This subject has
been the subject of much writing, and I do not discuss it as a separate problem.
Voluminous, expensive discovery does contribute to the impact of many of the aspects I
break out for separate discussion below, such as money, the shock wave effect, phasing, and
deep reach.
36. However, some rules may be seen as creating transaction costs in the name of
affording due process and safeguards, such that we have higher level of confidence in the
result than we would otherwise. At least in our legal world, such rules are not merely
transaction costs, a sort of potentially avoidable friction which interferes with the substance
of litigation; instead, they are basic to the process.
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But every rule extracts its pound of flesh: effort is required to comply
with page limits, forms and formats, and timing requirements. Time and
effort is also required to revamp issues in a case to fit into the molds of the
law. For example, a complex transaction must, to be the subject of suit, fit
within the constraints of how a cause of action is defined. Often the rules
act as counters in a zero-sum game: they are imposed by the court to make
the job of judges easier, but make the jobs of lawyers more expensive.
Twenty years ago, the Superior Court in Los Angeles mandated blue
backers: extra-long blue paper backing for each filing. These made it
simpler for some judges to locate a given filing, but created headaches for
lawyers. One north Bay Area county court required lawyers to appear in
person to obtain a hearing date on demurrers: I asked a judge there why this
has been done. It was an enormously successful rule, she assured me.
Why? Because it reduced the incidence of demurrers to almost zero. Now,
that is friction with a vengeance. In evaluating objections to deposition
designations, I require lawyers to create a single document which reflects
all designations, counter-designations and objections: this imposes a burden
on them, in order to save myself the burden of combing through sometimes
a dozen documents at the same time in a multi-party case to get a sense of
the objections in context. Roughly the same rationale applies to
requirements for the format of jury instructions, the provision of copies of
out-of-state cases, and so on and so forth.
The rules and defaults are written with the standard case in mind, and
some friction will always be imposed, but of course there are few of these
ideal standard cases, and so there will always be unnecessary friction, and
wise counsel and judges will try to ameliorate those costs. Lawyers will
ask for relief from the rules, often for the best of reasons. But even those
efforts are costly: seeking leave to file more pages than allowed, having
noticed periods reduced, negotiating informal discovery and factual
stipulations—all sensible moves—are not free. Some approaches, such as
bench trials as well as the use there of declarations and depositions in lieu
of live direct testimony, may well reduce friction but always at a cost, for
example, the loss of a jury, and the sustained live evaluations of significant
witnesses. With the second law of thermodynamics, there’s no such thing
as a free lunch.
3.

Information Flow

A case is series of events, each done presumably to inform the next.
At the highest level of abstraction, the complaint and answer inform the
scope of discovery, which informs the evidence to be had at trial, which
sets the stage for appeals. Theoretically, each stage cabins the next. This
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happens because, to be overly obvious, information flows from one phase
to the next. Breaks in this flow are bad, and the rapid flow of information
is good—although as we will see with the shock wave effect discussed
below, information may flow too fast to be useful.
Cases assigned to judges for all purposes, including cases assigned to
complex departments, benefit from—but sometimes are harmed by—
increased information flow from one point to the next in the life of the case.
There are some ways in which information is carried forward regardless of
whether a single judge is assigned to the case. For example, doctrines of
judicial estoppel,37 the use of formal stipulations, prior orders (of any
judge) in the case,38 concessions made on the record and in pleadings (such
as judicial admissions in complaints) are all sources of information which
carry forward into subsequent phases. Statements made in one brief or
memorandum can be used against the author in later motion practice. More
informally, case management and other conferences in singly assigned
cases generate information outside the written record, and while lawyers
may not technically be bound by these discussions, they do create an
overall sense of where the case is going and what parties are willing to do,
from which it can be difficult to stray. This helps constrain the case. The
use of court reporters, and case management orders summarizing events
and positions taken by the parties, preserve the information.
Because the judge’s memory is also a repository of information, it is
beneficial to have a single judge assigned to all phases of the case.39 It is
inefficient when a new judge is presiding to have lawyers re-educate a
37. See e.g., Jackson v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 96, 102 (Ct. App.
1997).
38. Some court orders are useful in this sense, and not others. For example, a decision
not to quash service of summons is not likely useful thereafter, but a decision on demurrer
may inform a subsequent motion for judgment on the pleadings. Some decisions are not
strictly speaking determinative in a subsequent phase but they may be persuasive, and this is
so especially when the same judge is presiding. Thus an order in a discovery motion only
resolves that dispute, but may have a strong influence on the resolution of the next discovery
dispute (regardless of who brings it). So too with a denial of summary judgment: such an
order has no subsequent utility (it is not admissible at trial for example) but its reasoning
may influence the subsequent choice of jury instructions and rulings on motions, for
example: directed verdict, a new trial, and judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Some
rulings, such as a determination that a plaintiff has enough evidence to survive an antiSLAPP motion, may play a significant and perhaps decisive role in motions for summary
judgment and adjudication, and motions for a preliminary injunction; and vice-versa.
39. I provide a short explanation for those unfamiliar with the options for judge
assignment. Some counties (and, historically, most all California counties) have a master
calendar approach by which cases are sent out for trial depending on which judge is ready
on that day. Earlier, the parties may have been sent to a variety of different judges, for
example for settlements, writs, motions (perhaps different judges depending on the motion),
and case management (such as might be under these circumstances).
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judge on the facts, or re-persuade the judge on the law.40
There are at least two adverse consequences of this information flow.
First, the judge may evaluate a current dispute under the influence of future
potential disputes and a present dispute in light of a past one. A simple
example is a late discovery dispute: the merits of allowing the discovery
may be overtaken by the imminence of a trial date. Parties may not ask for
an early trial date if they think it might cut off some other procedure such
as a forecast summary judgment motion or discovery. A party’s desire for
extensive discovery and the concomitant plea that there are myriad fact
issues may come back to haunt the party at the time of summary judgment,
when that party desires to argue that no fact issue remains in the case.
Many lawyers believe a judge is more tempted to grant a summary
judgment motion if she is the future trial judge than if she is not. In each
such event, the specific merits of the present motion or issue are evaluated
in the context of future proceedings. Some commentators have suggested
that to enable their views on substantive issues such as qualified immunity
for peace officers, judges may be influenced to not find constitutional
violations;41 and they may be constrained in their interpretations of statutes
such as the American Disabilities Act.42 And having issued preliminary
relief (such as a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction),
judges may have in effect steered themselves into granting future relief
consistent with the old order, regardless of the new evidence adduced.43
40. It is not, however, necessarily inefficient for the court. While single assignment is
routine in federal trial courts, it is not in state courts where some use master calendars to
send cases off for trial as soon as a courtroom is empty. This ensures the best use of
courtroom for trials, whereas in single assignment cases, a courtroom may have no trials for
extended periods of time. This may be seen as a waste of the scare resource. The optimal
approach (from the court’s point of view) of course depends on the types of cases generally
handled by the court, and where there are different types—and there always are—a
combination of master calendar and single assignment judges is optimal. That means that
some cases will never be singly assigned.
41. See Nancy Leong, The Saucier Qualified Immunity Experiment: An Empirical
Analysis, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 667, 670 (2009) (discussing the thought process of judges in
qualified immunity cases). Judges may modify their views on one element in order to avoid
an unpleasant ruling on a different element. One type of the avoidance canon, by which
courts generate an interpretation of a statute in order to avoid constitutional issues, may be
an example. Cf. Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Serious Constitutional Doubts: The
Supreme Court’s Construction of Statutes Raising Free Speech Concerns, 30 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1, 23-24 (1996) (explaining the use of the avoidance canon that judges use to avoid
answering certain constitutional questions).
See generally Trevor W. Morrison,
Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1189, 1216 (2006)
(discussing the canon of constitutional avoidance).
42. See Cheryl L. Anderson, Ideological Dissonance, Disability Backlash, and the
ADA Amendments Act, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1267, 1297 (2009) (discussing judicial
interpretations of the American Disabilities Act).
43. See Kevin J. Lynch, The Lock-in Effect of Preliminary Injunctions, 66 FLA. L. REV.
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Concomitantly, lawyers who foresee this free flow of information
(such as where we have a singly assigned judge) may be hesitant to commit
early in one context for fear of upsetting their position in an as-yet
uncontemplated future context. I recall a case in which at the first case
management conference I asked the parties if they agreed that the key
contract was unambiguous and that I need not look at extrinsic evidence.
No one knew of any ambiguities, and so the lawyers agreed, on the record.
Within twenty-four hours one side had frantically retracted the concession
for fear that its future discovery would be limited, and that it might be
unable to make arguments—as yet unformulated—on the interpretation of
the contract. This fear is deep-seated; whereas judges hope to secure early
agreements to streamline a case, lawyers generally refuse until they know
everything there is to know—that is, until it is too late to do anyone any
good. Attaining just the right information flow—enough to truly expedite
the case, but not so much that the parties balk—is a key to case
management.
As we see in the next section, there is another danger to information
flow.
4.

The Shock Wave Effect (telescoping information)

Every new (and not so new) judge knows what it is like to drink from
a fire hose. The most difficult assignments are those with fast, high volume
calendars: 30, perhaps 70 matters in a morning.44 We see this in some
misdemeanor, drug, and family courts. Those judges operate first with
scripts, and later almost instinctively. Heuristics—rules of thumb—and
standard procedures guide their actions. The slightest variation can cause
chaos. This is not because the judges are incapable of figuring out what to
do with variations, but because there is no time to account for them.
Decisions which spaced out over time present only a sort of linear
difficulty become qualitatively far more difficult and sometimes impossible
when they must be made in a very short amount of time. There isn’t
enough time to absorb the information from one event or moment to use it
779, 806 (2014) (discussing the effect of giving a preliminary injunction in later litigation).
44. The numbers are often much higher. John R. Emshwiller et al., Justice Is Swift as
Petty Crimes Clog Courts, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 2014, http:// www. wsj. com/articles/
justice-is-swift-as-petty-crimes-clog-courts-1417404782, archived at http://perma.cc/8FBQFAUA (“In Florida, misdemeanor courts routinely disposed of cases in three minutes or
less, usually with a guilty plea, according to a 2011 National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers study. In Detroit, court statistics show, a district judge on an average day
has over 100 misdemeanor cases on his or her docket—or one every four minutes.”);
Bernice B. Donald, The Art of Judging, JUDGES’ J., 17 (1994) (“Trial judges in high-volume
courts are often confronted with dockets containing 50 to 100 cases per day.”).
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in the next.
An analogy to shock waves illustrates this qualitative distinction.
When an object moves faster through a medium (such as water or air) than
the information about it can be transmitted, what was a gradual
compression is instantaneously transformed into a shock wave of explosive
force. This has been termed a phase transition which for our purposes
simply suggests a swift, powerful, and highly significant change in
phenomenon—generated solely and literally by increasing the speed of
information flow.45
So it may be in litigation when there are a large number of issues to be
resolved in finite time. As suggested, this may happen in cases not
traditionally thought of as complex. It happens in busy law and motion
courtrooms, where for example multiple motions for summary judgment
are scheduled most days (on top of other motions). It happens in routine
trials: it may be literally infeasible to handle a large number of pretrial
motions in limine just before the jury is about to be summoned, or last
minute reviews of jury instructions, or ruling on objections to expert
testimony during trial.46
In the complex arena the shock wave may manifest when hundreds or
thousands of mass tort cases are assigned to one judge. More routinely a
judge may have dozens of demurrers in a single case to hear one morning,
or other proceedings with differing input from a large number of parties on
a large number of issues. In the context of a single motion, the shock wave
effect may be seen as an example of a tight or close coupling problem.
Some complex systems such as space craft and nuclear reactor systems
have many subsystems which are all performing simultaneously and are
closely coupled, that is, the impact of one subsystem on others is not
buffered; accordingly failure may cascade through the systems without
constraint.47
45. See generally Shock Wave, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shock_wave,
archived at https://perma.cc/6P6A-XRR7 (“The abruptness of change in the features of the
medium, that characterize shock waves, can be viewed as a phase transition . . . .”). See also
G. E. Duvall et al., Phase transitions under shock-wave loading, 49 No. 3 REV. MODERN
PHYSICS, 523 (1977) (“Shock phenomena most commonly experienced by an individual are
the boom from supersonic aircraft, the crack of a rifle, and automobile pileups on crowded
freeways. The fact that the last-named event produces a shock wave suggests what is indeed
true: that shock waves are very general and are, if not ubiquitous, at least pervasive.”).
46. The objection will be that the testimony exceeds the scope of deposition testimony
and is not within the scope of the expert’s expertise. Thus the judge may be asked—perhaps
at a brief sidebar conference—to compare (a) the subject matter of sometimes multiple
volumes of testimony, (b) the scope of a formal disclosure or outline of proposed testimony
and (c) the areas within which the expert is actually qualified to have opinions.
47. See CHARLES PERROW, NORMAL ACCIDENTS: LIVING WITH HIGH-RISK
TECHNOLOGIES (1999)(explaining the possible dangers of failure in high risk technologies );
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There are analogies in the legal system, in particular with complex
motions such as those for class certification, summary judgment and antiSLAPP. One error can cascade through the sequence of sub-issues,
resulting in a failed motion, with resultant very high inefficiencies.
Summary judgment motions are entirely notorious in this respect: small
errors in form and format,48 errors in the title of papers,49 errors in timing
service,50 and inaccurate handling of evidentiary objections can doom an
otherwise meritorious proposal51 (or indeed result in granting motions that
otherwise would never be granted52). In these motions, a large number of
CHARLES PERROW, THE NEXT CATASTROPHE: REDUCING OUR VULNERABILITIES TO
NATURAL, INDUSTRIAL, AND TERRORIST DISASTERS 260-61, 264 (2007) (describing operating
system vulnerabilities).
48. CAL. R. CT. 3.1350(d) (stating separate statement must identify and be arranged by
each cause of action). Other formatting requirements are found at California Rules of Court
3.1350(h). Failures in properly arranging the separate statement may lead to denial of the
motion. See also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 437c(b)(1) (West 2015) (describing the
supporting papers for a motion for summary judgment); Batarse v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union
Local 1000, 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d 340, 350 (Ct. App. 2012) (“In Security Pacific, the plaintiff
filed a motion for summary judgment; the defendant, represented by counsel, filed
opposition that included a separate statement of disputed and undisputed facts. The trial
court denied the motion without prejudice because it was not in proper form . . . .” (citing
Sec. Pac. Nat’l Bank v. Bradley, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 220 (Ct. App. 1992))); Kojababian v.
Genuine Home Loans, Inc., 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d 288, 297 (Ct. App. 2009) (holding that the trial
court was correct to deny the opportunity to cure failure to file statement of undisputed
material facts).
49. If the notice of motion seeks only summary judgment, a court cannot grant
summary adjudication. Homestead Sav. v. Superior Court, 224 Cal. Rptr. 554, 559 (Ct.
App. 1986); CAL. R. CT. 3.1110(a), 3.1350(b).
50. Robinson v. Woods, 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 241, 250 (Ct. App. 2008) (holding the motion
cannot be granted if 75 days’ notice not provided, and court cannot provide relief); see also
Urshan v. Musicians’ Credit Union, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 839 (Ct. App. 2004) (holding that trial
courts do not have the discretion to shorten the notice period); McMahon v. Superior Court,
130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 407 (Ct. App. 2003) (holding that trial courts do not have the authority to
shorten the minimum notice period for summary judgment hearings).
51. Objections must be made in a certain form. CAL. R. CT. 3.1354. If not, the
objections may be overruled, and consequently evidence will come in and may thus either
rebut a factual dispute where there ought to be one (and so have the motion granted), or
successfully create a factual dispute where there ought not to be one (and so have the motion
denied). See Cole v. Town of Los Gatos, 140 Cal. Rptr. 3d 722, 734 n.6 (Ct. App. 2012)
(“[W]here a trial court is confronted on summary judgment with a large number of nebulous
evidentiary objections, a fair sample of which appear to be meritless, the court can properly
overrule . . . all of the objections on the ground that they constitute oppression of the
opposing party and an imposition on the resources of the court.”).
52. For example, if plaintiff fails to properly authenticate its evidence in opposition to
the motion, or makes the wrong objection to the moving defendant’s motion, or fails to
prepare a proper separate statement in opposition, the motion may be granted when it
otherwise would not be. See Hodjat v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 149 Cal. Rptr. 3d 93
(Ct. App. 2012) (holding that the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to consider
evidentiary objections not filed separately in compliance with Rules of Court).
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papers interact with each other, and these papers are subject to a very wide
spectrum of tests for adequacy.53 Generally, there is no time to fix things;
all the papers are submitted at once and a single point of failure will be
decisive. Often, because these motions are made when the case is mature
and close to trial, and because the notice period is ferociously long,54 there
will not be a second chance.
Similar problems are encountered in motions to certify a class where
everything happens at once: the evidence is presented; it must be
admissible, or objections must be correct; the class definition must cohere
with liability theories; and ascertainability must be demonstrated. The
choice of liability theories will affect the adequacy of the class definition,
and both will affect the decision of what evidence to submit. These factors
will likely determine whether the common issues predominate over
individual issues, a central inquiry in this type of motion. The balance here
must be just right, for the case is probably over if the court denies the
certification motion. We even have a nice term for it: death knell.55
Anti-SLAPP motions are infamously complex. By these motions
defendants at a very early stage of litigation seek to strike the complaint on
the basis that the complaint is a covert weapon designed to inhibit
defendants from exercising their constitutional rights to free speech and
petitioning the government. A classic example involves a chain store
company suing the local neighborhood association on a trumped-up charge
of defamation or interference with prospective contractual advantage
because the association is demonstrating to stop the corporation’s plans to
build a giant store in the residential area.56 Within the confines of a single
motion, generally decided at once, and probably on a day when other
motions are up for argument, the following issues may be presented: (i)

53. As the notes above suggest, some papers are measured by formatting requirements.
Others require a mastery of the law of evidence, while others must be titled correctly.
54. Seventy-five days’ notice is required, which is usually extended to eighty days to
account for mailed service. Before the flood, these sorts of motions used to be filed with the
same notice period as any other motion, about fifteen days. See, e.g., Taylor v. Jones, 175
Cal. Rptr. 678, 679 (Ct. App. 1981) (declining to modify the requisite notice period for a
motion for summary judgment to less than fifteen days).
55. The death knell doctrine allows the defeated class representative who brought the
suit to appeal the certification denial, even though her individual case is still alive in the trial
court. Normally this would bar an appeal because appeals are allowed only after a complete
and final judgment. See Marenco v. DirecTV LLC, 183 Cal. Rptr. 3d 587, 591-93 (Ct. App.
2015) (defining the death knell doctrine and deciding that the case does not fall within the
death knell doctrine’s procedural requirements).
56. See, e.g., Mann v. Quality Old Time Serv., Inc., 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 215, 221 (Ct. App.
2004) (analyzing an anti-SLAPP motion in a defamation and trade libel case). See generally
THOMAS R. BURKE, ANTI-SLAPP LITIGATION (2015 ed. 2015) (discussing anti-SLAPP
motions).
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whether to allow some discovery; (ii) whether the complaint properly
pleads a cause of action under standards similar to those used in
demurrers;57 (iii) whether the claims implicate the defendant’s
constitutional rights to speech or petitioning under one or more of four
related tests; (iv) whether there are applicable exemptions within those
tests; (v) whether the actions complained-of in the complaint plainly allege
criminal conduct; (vi) under standards similar to those used in summary
judgment motions, whether the plaintiff has enough evidence to support the
claims, which may require a claim-by-claim analysis to determine if there
is a match with evidence as well as rulings on objections to evidence; (vii)
whether attorney fees are awardable under one or two different standards
(depending on which side prevails on the underlying anti-SLAPP motion).58
These motions are very difficult to brief because there are many different
sorts of analyses at play, and the result on one may have a decisive effect
on the next. These motions are difficult to decide for similar reasons. This
presents a classic case of the shock wave effect.
5.

Money

The injection of well-funded parties or very high stakes creates
57. See, e.g., Wilson v. Parker, 50 P.3d 733, 739 (Cal. 2002) (evaluating whether
plaintiff sufficiently stated a claim).
58. Even this labored description of an anti-SLAPP motion hides such complexities as
(1) handling mixed causes of action; see, e.g., GetFugu, Inc. v. Patton Boggs LLP, 162 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 831, 833-34 (Ct. App. 2013) (reversing an order granting a special motion to strike
with respect to one cause of action and affirming the order in all other respects); Cho v.
Chang, 161 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846, 851 (Ct. App. 2013) (“[T]he guiding principle in applying the
anti-SLAPP statute to a mixed cause of action case is that ‘a plaintiff cannot frustrate the
purposes of the SLAPP statute through a pleading tactic of combining allegations of
protected and nonprotected activity under the label of one “cause of action.” (quoting Fox
Searchlight Pictures, Inc., v. Palodino, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 906, 918 (Ct. App. 2001))); City of
Colton v. Singletary, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 74, 89 (Ct. App. 2012) (“When a cross-complainant
presents a mixed cause of action that involves protected and non-protected activities, as is
the case here, the question presented is whether the gravamen of the cause of action targets
protected activity.” (quoting Haight Ashbury Free Clinics v. Happening House Ventures,
110 Cal. Rptr. 3d 129, 138-39 (Ct. App. 2010))); cf. Burrill v. Nair, 158 Cal. Rptr. 3d 332,
349-51 (Ct. App. 2013) (holding that if a plaintiff can plead a probability of prevailing on
any part of her claim, the cause of action will not be stricken); (2) determining the
“gravamen” of a cause of action; see, e.g., Old Republic Constr. Program Grp. v. Boccardo
Law Firm, Inc., 179 Cal. Rptr. 3d 129, 135 (Ct. App. 2014) (“The question whether a cause
of action arises from specified conduct for purposes of the statute depends on ‘the principal
thrust or gravamen of the plaintiff’s cause of action.’” (quoting Robles v. Chalilpoyil, 104
Cal. Rptr. 3d 628 (Ct. App. 2010))); and (3) deciding what the commercial exception
covers; see, e.g., Brill Media Co. v. TCW Grp., 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d 371, 383-85 (Ct. App.
2005) (analyzing whether California Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision
(b)(1) applies to defendants’ alleged conduct).
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complexity; more precisely, money triggers the potential for complexity in
any case. There are roughly four related ways in which money becomes a
problem in this sense: via (1) attorneys’ fees clauses; (2) very wealthy
parties; (3) substantial insurance defense funds, and (4) high money stakes.
Cases where the victor may obtain attorney’s fees become
increasingly difficult to settle as those investments go up,59 and in these
cases we do not have the usual incentives to conserve resources. Those
incentives are also often missing in cases that involve very wealthy parties
and parties with unsupervised defense expenditures pursuant to an
insurance policy,60 who are frequently unreasonable in their assessment of
risk and cost.
This willingness to spend infects a case. Cases where a lot of money
is at stake are not necessarily more complex than smaller cases, but this is
difficult for parties and lawyers to grasp. I am frequently told that I should
allow more time, discovery, procedures, pages in a brief, weeks of trial, or
hours of argument because there is a lot of money at stake. This becomes a
self-fulfilling prophecy, a vicious cycle: high stakes convince parties to
expect very high costs, so they secure the services of high cost attorneys,
which causes costs to rise.
The result is a variant of the lottery effect. In lotteries, we are
irrationally willing to give up money in return for an infinitesimally small
chance of a very high reward. Parties and lawyers assume the high stakes
justify high spending on very low probability options. Where spending
$50,000 may be absurdly high in a low stakes case to ensure one has every
last email from the other side, parties in a $20 million case will conclude
otherwise. The same reasoning leads a party to map and test out every
issue which conceivably has any relationship to the merits—the Edge
Problem. A party may spend a lot of money on a low probability option
because it may increase the odds of eventual success and slightly shift the
59. See CURTIS KARNOW, Timing Settlement, supra note 15, at 6 (“We know from
experience that the availability of attorney’s fees often blocks settlement late in the life of
the case, especially when the fees expended outweigh the reasonable settlement of the case
absent such fees.”).
60. An insurer’s duty to defend may create incentives to throw huge sums of money
into a case, in order to avoid or reduce the possibility of a judgment in excess of policy
limits. Insured parties wish to avoid judgments in excess of those limits as a matter of
course. Insurers have the same wish because they do not want to be accused of having acted
unreasonably, breaching the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and consequently on
the hook for a judgment in excess of policy limits. See generally Gulf Ins. Co. v. TIG Ins.
Co., 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 305, 312 (Ct. App. 2001) (discussing the elements of a cause of
action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing); H. WALTER CROSKEY ET
AL., CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: INSURANCE LITIGATION ¶¶ 12:225-:341 (2015 ed. 2015)
(discussing a bad faith action based on an insurer’s failure or refusal to settle a third party’s
claims against the insured).
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settlement envelope in its favor; in a high stakes case, a very small shift
may be worth a lot of money. The cost of a procedure or motion pales to
relative insignificance in the light of very high stakes, at least as far as the
parties are concerned.
From the perspective of the courts, this is dysfunctional behavior.
Wise case management and thoughtful settlement positions tend to focus
on the probable outcome and probable worth of the case.61 We ask what
the case is probably worth and what evidence is probably going to be
useful. When we ask how to best spend our time or resources, we
implicitly tag the options with high and low costs and high and low utility
and preferentially seek high utility and low cost.
But when the stakes are very high or the parties have a vast amount to
spend (the two do not always describe the same cases), the parties tend to
concentrate on the outlier areas. They focus on not only the middle of the
bell curve where the most useful procedures likely reside, but also at the
outliers: the tail ends of the probability bell curve, which involve making
motions, doing discovery, and taking positions that will probably make no
difference and can be read by the court (and juries) as frivolous.
There are two related areas of quicksand here. In the context of
discovery motions, judges are told that under the rule of proportionality, the
stakes should be considered when directing expenditures of resources to
comply with discovery demands.62 We simply cannot have a $50,000
demand for documents when the case is worth $10,000. But the converse
is not necessarily true: that we should have a $50,000 demand in a case
worth $20 million.
As suggested above, especially in cases involving potential recovery
of attorney’s fees from the other side, but in any case in which very large
amounts of money have been spent, settlement becomes increasing difficult
as the case goes on. Parties and lawyers are subject to what I call the VietNam Syndrome and what economists usually call the “sunk costs” fallacy.
Having sunk innumerable dollars into the litigation, parties will not settle
for some small fraction of that amount—even though past expenditures are
usually irrelevant to the settlement decision, which should be based on the
odds of securing a future return at trial. If a plaintiff could win a maximum
of $100 at trial, then she should settle for some reasonable fraction of that;
it does not matter if she spent $50 or $5,000 to get to that point. But in fact
it does: irrational cognitive fallacies infect decision making all the time,

61. See infra Section VIII (exploring judges’ tools for managing complex cases).
62. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) requires judges to limit discovery when “the discovery sought
is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is
more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive.”
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and cases involving a lot of money make this more likely.63 The problem is
more intractable when there is an attorneys’ fees clause because it is not
entirely irrational to count past expenditures. In those cases, the tail truly
does end up wagging the dog: consideration of the fees often trumps an
evaluation of the merits.
6.

The Unintended Impact of Complex Treatment

In California, there are two courts that pick the cases they will hear:
the Supreme Court, which generally chooses which cases to review, and the
complex litigation courts, which pass on applications for complex
treatment filed by one or more parties. Presumably the parties seek
complex treatment because they wish for wise management and the
opportunity to channel their efforts, constrain costs, and have some control.
However, designation of a case as “complex” may increase the costs and
complexity of litigation, and it may vastly increase the time to judgment.
As I will discuss below in Section VII, the complex litigation judge
has many weapons in her arsenal. Chief among them include the ability to
pace and stagger such events as discovery and motions and bifurcate issues
into a series of bench trials and other sorts of phasing. These tools may
solve one set of problems but create others. These tools solve the shock
wave problem and help the judge reach the right (i.e., considered) result
when the crush of work may make serious evaluation of an issue difficult.
On the other hand, complex designation may ensure that every
possible issue, including outliers, will be treated. Absent complex
designation, the issues may not have been raised or may have been seen as
moot or irrelevant.64 That designation may increase the time and money
spent on litigation. In non-complex cases, issues such as jury instructions
and evidentiary rulings may never be raised because the case settles, a
different determination (e.g. a summary judgment order) terminates or
modifies the case, or as the case unfolds at trial, the issue is ignored by the
lawyers or mooted by other events. Since the vast majority of cases settle,
issues that arguably matter only to trial may never be reached. Trial has a
wonderfully focusing effect on the experienced lawyer: the thirty-five
affirmative defenses are unceremoniously thrown overboard; claims are
pared down; of the fifty persons on the witness list, ten show up; problems
with the admissibility of thousands of documents are forgotten in favor of
63. See generally Andrew J. Wistrich et al., supra note 16, at 612-20 (discussing the
“sunk-cost fallacy”).
64. Thus appellate courts are reluctant to interfere with trial proceedings, short of an
appeal. Issues raised by writ petitions may never have to be considered at the end of the
case.
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the fifty items that the jury will actually review.65 Even potentially decisive
issues such as statutes of limitations may be swept under the rug as the
relative strength and power of other issues dominate the trial.
Complex judges tend to peel out as many issues as they can as early as
possible. (I am guilty here: I have jocularly66 suggested to horrified
lawyers that we have a jury instruction conference a week after the Answer
is filed.) But when all of the issues are handled before trial, sometimes
long before trial, the focusing effect of trial is lost. When judges manage a
complex case for years before it gets to trial, each conceivable issue can be
broken out for early, separate, exhaustive treatment. This increases the
odds of spending time and money on outlier issues, and it can turn a two
year case into a five year case.
Getting to trial as fast as one practically can is an important governor
of discovery costs. We do discovery to avoid “ambush” at trial and to
ensure high confidence in the final result. But discovery also redirects
costs by shifting them from the trial to pretrial work. This reduces trial
time, which includes the high cost of a judge’s time67 to pretrial work.
Discovery diminishes trial complexity at the cost of increasing pretrial
complexity. But without a trial—and especially in complex cases, we
rarely have trials68—all the costs are incurred, but not all the benefits are
gained.
B. Case Types
Here I outline five general types of complex cases. These share some
characteristics, and each may be animated by some of the mechanisms I
have just outlined above. But distinguishing them will be useful as we go
over some of the means of control later in Section VII.
1. Multi-step
Some cases and issues in cases are seen as complex because the
participants must traverse a long series of steps, factors, or tests. When the
steps must be handled in a short period of time, we run into a shock wave
effect. We can see this operate at a small scale with a hearsay objection,
sometimes formulated and ruled on within a few seconds at trial. The

65. However, not all lawyers handling complex cases are accomplished trial lawyers.
These lawyers may still hope to use 10,000 exhibits.
66. That is, jocose only as a judge thinks it, which usually means: not funny at all.
67. Judges’ time is a “high” cost in the sense that it is scarce and is often a bottleneck
in the processing of cases.
68. See supra text accompanying note 15.
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purpose of the evidence must be ascertained, which first requires a good
grip on the issues to be proved at trial; that is, materiality must be first
treated. Then the many types of exceptions to the hearsay rule are
evaluated. Similar analyses are made under California Evidence Code
section 1101(a) regulating the admission of character evidence.69
As described above some motions—typically those thought of as
complex—have this multi-step aspect: anti-SLAPP, summary judgment
and class certification. While any judge can handle these motions, the
nature of these motions is a reason to have judges familiar with the
procedures do so: they know what can go wrong, what to look for, even
when the lawyers do not.
Some legal tests with multiple factors are sequential; anti-SLAPP, for
all of its Rube Goldberg complexity, is an example. One methodically
plods through any requests for discovery, examines the complaint to
determine if it is well-pled, reviews exemptions and exceptions, the
criminal activity preclusion, the first prong, the second prong, considers fee
requests, and so on.70
More significantly for present purposes, other tests require the
simultaneous balancing of multiple incommensurate factors each of which
is more or less present across a spectrum: these tests could be termed
complex, as opposed to merely complicated. The humble discovery
motion, often requiring the balancing of burden with relevancy, is a perfect
example: these classic two factors are incommensurate, i.e. they are not on
the same scale, yet judges are asked to balance them against each other.71
So too with the balancing done for preliminary injunctions: we balance (i)
the likelihood of prevailing (the merits) against (ii) the result of a separate
69. See B. SIMONS, SIMONS CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE MANUAL § 6:1, at 470-72 (2015 ed.
2015) (discussing California Evidence Code section 1101(a)).
70. See generally, ROBERT I. WEIL ET AL., CALIFORNIA PRACTICE GUIDE: CIVIL
PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL ¶ 7:500 (2015) (providing an overview of anti-SLAPP motions).
71. While discovery fights are commonly thought of as involving two factors, there are
more. As I write elsewhere in this note, the stakes of the case are pertinent to the
proportionality factor. And what I have termed the relevancy issue actually hides two
separate factors: the pertinence or materiality of the issue in the case and the utility or
relevancy of the specific discovery at stake to that issue. There is a further factor, usually
hidden in the evaluation of burden: the availability of other means of discovery. I
summarize: if Alice wants a document from Bob, the burden analysis will involve (a) the
stakes in the case (e.g., lots of money versus not very much), (b) where else the data on the
document could be found (nowhere else, versus from a lot of different places including
Alice’s own files, implicating an analysis of the burden on Alice to get the data from some
other place), and (c) how much time and effort it will cost Bob to produce it. The other
factors are: what issue the document relates to (a core issue versus outlier), and how
important the document is to that issue (it will help a little versus help a lot). That is five
factors. Each is on a spectrum (from a little to a lot), and with exception of Alice’s and
Bob’s burdens, each spectrum is entirely incommensurate with all the others.
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balancing of respective harms to the parties. And so too for the common
balancing under California Evidence Code section 352: the prejudicial
impact of the evidence versus its probative value.72 Other common tests,
such as trademark infringement, require the evaluation of about eight
incommensurate factors,73 and the test to determine if one is an employee
or an independent contractor depends on evaluating one primary factor and
seven secondary factors.74 Deciding attorneys’ fees for services to a minor
or a person with a disability involves fourteen factors, some with subparts,
and almost all of them incommensurate with each other.75 There are
nineteen factors to consider as one decides whether to let cameras in a
courtroom.76 Tests for alter ego liability,77 sentencing, and many others
involve this multi-step, multi-factor process, often as part of a single
analysis and almost always pitting incommensurate factors (many of which
are more or less present, as across a spectrum) against each other.
But we are not done. There are different ways in which these factors
interact, and the rules of interaction are not always obvious. In some
situations, all the factors are, as it were, in the soup: they all have an
essential role. Discovery motions and the balancing under California
Evidence Code section 352 probably fall under this rubric.78 In other
situations, any of the factors might be decisive. For example, class action
certification motions are doomed if any of the usual factors (e.g.,
72. CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 2015).
73. See Winchester Mystery House, LLC v. Global Asylum, Inc., 148 Cal. Rptr. 3d
412, 426 (Ct. App. 2012) (discussing the eight Polaroid factors (citing Polaroid Corp. v.
Polaroid Elec. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961)), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820 (1961));
see also In re E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (3d Cir. 1973) (holding
that the Du Pont factors are used in opposition proceedings within the Trademark Office
when two marks are in apparent conflict, as opposed to the district court context where
Polaroid is the typical citation).
74. See S. G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 769 P.2d 399, 409
(Cal. 1989) cited with approval in Ayala v. Antelope Valley Newspapers, Inc., 327 P.3d
165, 176 (Cal. 2014) (discussing the factors for an independent contractor); see also 17
U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (stating that the factors—such as the key factors of (1) amount of
original material used and (2) the impact on the market for the original item—are
incommensurate.); cf. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577–78 (1994)
(holding that in an action alleging copyright infringement, a court should weigh each of
many factors on a “case-by-case” basis, and depending on the facts of the case, some factors
may weigh more heavily than others).
75. CAL. R. CT. 7.955.
76. The last factor being: “(S) Any other factor the judge deems relevant.” CAL. R. CT.
1.150(e)(3).
77. There are at least fourteen factors for alter ego liability “[a]mong” others “under
the particular circumstances of each case,” and as the court noted, the “long list of factors is
not exhaustive.” Greenspan v. LADT, LLC, 121 Cal. Rptr. 3d 118, 138-39 (Ct. App. 2010),
(quoting Zoran Corp. v. Chen, 110 Cal. Rptr. 3d 597 (Ct. App. 2010)).
78. CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 2015).
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ascertainability, counsel competence, predominance of common issues,
etc.) fails.79 In other contexts, there are many relevant factors but only a
few are usually decisive, as in the tests for independent contractor status.80
Sometimes the rhetoric of the tests suggests all factors ought to be
considered, but this is false: one or two factors are in practice decisive and
the rest are brusquely arranged to conform.81 Sometimes the factors are
just a list of things to think about, any of which might have some, or a lot,
of weight, but not necessarily. Setting a trial date is like that.82 In other
situations, the list of factors is actually a way of listing the aspects or
characteristic of a legal notion: enough of them and the notion is manifest.
For example, the Supreme Court has cited about eight factors involved in
deciding whether one is an agent of another.83 For all their variety, these
factors all harken back to a single guiding thread: they are different ways of
thinking about control and direction; they are facets of the single factual
predicate which in sum might, or might not, lead one to conclude that
someone was an agent of another.
This is not the place to complain too much about these tests;84 there
79. See generally WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS §§ 3:2
(5th ed. 2011) (discussing a prerequisite to class certification in some courts that the class is
definite and ascertainable), 3:50-3:88 (discussing the adequacy of counsel requirement),
3:18 (discussing the common issues requirement); ROBERT I. WEIL, supra note 70, ch. 14
(2015) (discussing representative and class actions).
80. See Judd J. Balmer, Civil Forfeiture Under 21 U.S.C. § 881 and the Eighth
Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 999, 1028 (1996) (discussing how
the multifactor tests for permissible civil forfeitures generally comes down to a look at two
factors).
81. This is probably true in trademark infringement cases. Barton Beebe, An Empirical
Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1581, 1582
(2006) (“[C]ourts typically declare that no single factor outcome is dispositive. The data
clearly contradict this assertion.”).
82. CAL. R. CT. 3.729 (listing the twenty-five factors. The twenty-fifth one reads:
“(25) Any other factor that would significantly affect the determination of the appropriate
date of trial.”).
83. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751-52 (1989) (“No one
of these factors is determinative. . . . [T]he skill required; the source of the instrumentalities
and tools; the location of the work; the duration of the relationship between the parties;
whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the
extent of the hired party’s discretion over when and how long to work; the method of
payment; the hired party’s role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part of
the regular business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision
of employee benefits, and the tax treatment of the hired party.”).
84. Others have done so in a wide variety of contexts. See, e.g., Palmer v. Chicago,
806 F.2d 1316, 1318 (7th Cir. 1986) (“[A]s with so many multi-‘pronged’ legal tests it
manages to be at once redundant, incomplete, and unclear.”); Benjamin L. Ellison, More
Connection, Less Protection? Off-Campus Speech with on-Campus Impact, 85 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 809, 847 (2010) (articulating tests for First Amendment protection for off campus
speech by students); Autumn Fox et al., An Eagle Soaring: The Jurisprudence Of Justice
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may not be any other good way to capture the complexity of the real world
problems that end up in court and at the same time provide some guidance
for their resolution. For now it is enough to note three things.
First, there is an uncertain relationship among factors and the
peculiarity of balancing incommensurate factors.
Second, the balancing of factors by trial judges generally implies an
abuse of discretion standard on appeal, and so some assurance that if the
trial judge seemed to be thinking about them, the judge’s decision will be
upheld. But this expectation is upset when, despite the rhetoric, the trial
and appellate courts do not share the same assumption about the way in
which the factors are to be wielded.85
Third, one will generally need a wide variety of facts before one can
even begin to make the decision, and when the list of factors is open ended,
one will not know when one has enough facts. This is much more a
problem for the parties and lawyers than it is for the judge: the judge is
entitled simply to look at what has been served up, decide who has the
burden of convincing her, and then see if the burden has been met (I set
aside the other problems in weighing the factors). The problem is that the
lawyers will not know when to stop their investigation and accumulation of
evidence.
Some complex cases have this feature too, that is, they require the
parties and court to move through a long series of steps. The case begins
with a series of demurrers, moves to discovery, then perhaps to a class
certification motion, then fuller merits discovery, motions for summary
judgment, and so on. Cases may be more complicated: the parties may
have early motions to quash service of summons, to change venue, for a
Antonin Scalia, 19 CAMPBELL L. REV. 223 (1997) (discussion of Justice Scalia’s advocacy
for clear rules); Matthew P. Harrington, After the Flood: Cleaning Up the Test for Admiralty
Jurisdiction over Tort, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 40 (1995) (describing a test for admiralty
jurisdiction); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175,
1179 (1989) (discussing the totality of circumstances test).
85. We have this issue with, for example, class certification decisions. See EISENBERG
ET AL., supra note 26 (“The law, however, does not require any particular level of detail in
the trial court’s order.”) (quoting Dailey v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 154 Cal. Rptr. 3d 480,
491 (Ct. App. 2013)). While evidentiary rulings are said to be subject to the deferential
abuse of discretion standards, see Twenty-Nine Palms Enters. Corp. v. Bardos, 149 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 52, 62 (Ct. App. 2012), and rarely lead to reversal, Margaret A. Berger, see When,
If Ever, Does Evidentiary Error Constitute Reversible Error?, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 893,
894 (1992), when trial judges get the law wrong, the appellate courts say so, and may
reverse, even when the issue is a balancing test, see, e.g., People v. Edwards, 193 Cal. Rptr.
696, 744(Cal. Ct. App. 2015), and because many such rulings are in fact just the application
of law. See, e.g., Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Tokio Marine & Nichido
Fire Ins. Co., 185 Cal. Rptr. 3d 296, 303 (Ct. App. 2015)(applying the factors for class
certification); Collins v. Navistar, Inc., 155 Cal. Rptr. 3d 137, 160 (Ct. App. 2013) (using
the factors in deciding on class certification).
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temporary restraining order and then preliminary injunction, and so on.
This is the usual reason complex cases are so designated. Perhaps because
of the money at stake or available, the number of motions brought makes
these parties “frequent fliers”—the case will benefit from a smooth
movement of information from one phase to the rest. Jiggering with the
various steps—taking them out of order, or constraining the time for
each—might advance the case. We will discuss these and other control
mechanisms below in Section VII.
2. Sprawling
Another frequent reason for complex designation is that a case is
related to a sometimes vast series of other cases, both locally and
sometimes across the nation. Multi-district court litigation (MDL) is the
classic example. Mass tort actions, such as those brought against makers of
allegedly dangerous drugs, surgical implants, cars, and so on will be
brought as separate actions—sometimes many thousands of separate
actions—across the country, and will find themselves in both state and
federal courts. The federal system can collect all the federal cases before a
single judge,86 and California has a means to send its cases, regardless of
where filed in the state, to a single judge.87 The various states do not have a
formal means of coordinating multi-state collections, and accordingly the
coordination often is done though the federal MDL case. Often, these
cases are coordinated for pretrial purposes, and then are peeled off to
separate courtrooms, perhaps back to the county of their origin, for trial.
But still, many hundreds of cases may await trial in a single courthouse.
There are many variants of this pattern of sprawling litigation.
Sometimes, such as in antitrust, securities, and other fraud cases, there are
parallel criminal investigations, and simply the existence or possibility of
criminal investigations can stymie the civil litigation because principal
defense actors are, for very good reason, likely to refuse to participate in
discovery. Major frauds can take years to resolve, with a concomitant
impact on the civil side. In asbestos cases, the same set of defendants—
sometimes in the hundreds—are named in a large number of cases, and
while those cases may not be formally coordinated, the positions taken on
discovery and, most importantly, settlement are inextricably intertwined;

86. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1407, 2112; see generally, JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT
LITIGATION, http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/rules-procedures (last visited Nov. 12, 2015),
archived at http://perma.cc/G9TK-MBE8 (articulating procedures for the United States
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation).
87. See, e.g., CAL. R. CT. 3.510-.516 (stating rules for state-wide coordination of
complex cases).
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suffice it here to note that settlement of one case is a function of settlement
positions taken in a large number of other cases.88 In other situations, the
same parties file in many different jurisdictions for some perceived local
advantage—the classic race to the courthouse. In one case I had, a party
filed in one county; this was met with the other side’s filing in a second
county for a declaration that the first party’s lawyers should be disqualified;
cases were also filed in two other state counties, as well as in one federal
court where remand proceedings were pending when I held my first case
management conference. We had, at one time, claims in three counties,
some of the state claims on appeal (in two different appellate districts), and
some in federal court. And that was with a single plaintiff and single
defendant.
Defendants in, for example, mass tort actions are usually represented
by a single coordinating firm (there will likely be local counsel in each
court), but this may not be true of plaintiffs’ counsel; there may be many,
many of them, each interested in pressing his own case, taking advantage
of discovery and other events in other cases as they seek to reduce costs in
his own case. One should not make the mistake of concluding that
therefore the management troubles just come from plaintiffs; they do not.
A defendant in these situations is well placed to use events in one case to
interfere with events in others: to use otherwise local features of one case to
delay proceedings nation-wide. Both plaintiffs and defendants have the
ability to impose high costs on the other side.
A central obstacle in these sorts of sprawling cases is the World War
II convoy problem: the litigation moves at the speed of the slowest case.
The center of gravity may be the federal MDL case because, as I have
mentioned, it collects federal cases from around the United States and so
deals with issues shared with all the state jurisdictions. Discovery is often
coordinated through the MDL. Occasionally a decisive issue, such as
federal preemption, might be handled there and have at least strong
persuasive (if not decisive) impact on the state actions. For all these
reasons, any delays in the MDL (which may be the slow boat) ramify
throughout the rest of the cases. The agglutination of these cases may also
suggest that they settle as a group, which too may delay the resolution of
any given subset of cases.
If not funneled through either an MDL or particular massed state
proceedings, coordination of discovery in these cases can be difficult, and
even with coordination there is often at least some discovery that needs to
be done on a per case basis; for example, in mass tort cases, the specifics of
exposure, medical history, and related background for each plaintiff.

88. See infra p. 62 (alluding to the notion of the institutional litigant).
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As suggested above, settlement of these cases can be tricky. Parties
are often unwilling to settle an isolated case on its own merits for at least
two reasons. First, the cost of pre-trial activity is not attributable to the one
case but spreads out over many cases; settlement of the one case may make
little difference to the defendants’ general exposure and will not materially
reduce the plaintiffs’ pre-trial costs. Second, as I have discussed
elsewhere,89 the parties are “institutional litigants” and can never settle one
case without considering the impact on the rest of the case inventory, and
so each party tends to be more intransigent on a given case than it
otherwise would. This intransigence can be ameliorated when parties settle
groups of cases at once, because this helps them conceal their weakness on
any given case. That is, group settlements tend to hide the fact that the
plaintiffs and defendants placed a low value (from their respective
perspectives) on what is for each a weak case. This preserves their
reputation as tough negotiators and so does not undermine future
negotiations. Thus, in asbestos litigation individual cases almost never
settle, but groups of them do. This poses serious problems for the
administration of a given case because there is little a judge can do to move
it towards settlement, and frequently nothing happens until the case is in
trial, for it is only at that point that parties begin to expend time and effort
on the case.90
3. Multi-party
Even within the context of a single case with many parties,
coordination and settlement can be difficult to arrange, although usually not
on the same scale as for a collection of distributed cases noted just above.
In this category we find coverage actions with many potential insurers and
tort claims against a long list of users, manufactures, and distributors
(asbestos cases are an example of this).
Moving these sorts of cases towards settlement can be complicated by
the rules that apply to set-offs as a result of earlier settlements. There are
the usual pressures for early settlement such as savings on costs of
litigation and, perhaps, taking advantage of an asymmetry of information
that would be rectified as discovery progressed. But there are also

89. Curtis Karnow, Conflicts of Interest and Institutional Litigants, 32 J. LEGAL PROF.
7 (2008).
90. Especially in asbestos cases, the parties usually need to do very little to prepare an
individual case for trial. At least in my court, they usually file roughly the same motions in
limine, the same oppositions; use the same experts, exhibits, demonstrations; and often are
content to use the first few days of trial to offer deposition testimony (which costs little to
present).
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pressures to delay settlement. Under Proposition 51 (embodied in Cal. Civ.
Code section 1431.2), joint tortfeasors are all jointly and severally liable for
economic damages such as medical bills and wage loss, but each is only
liable for a percentage of non-economic damages (such as pain and
suffering) corresponding to a defendant’s percentage of fault.91 A
defendant may wish to delay settlement for a variety of the usual reasons,
but also because in these multi-party cases its liability for economic
damages—which defaults to 100%—will reduce as a function of set-offs by
other defendants: all things equal, one wishes to be the last settling
defendant because at that point the value of the case has been severely
diminished. This may have the effect of pushing many settlements to just
before trial—or, as in many asbestos cases, just after trial has begun.
A final word on class actions; they are commonly thought of as multiparty cases and thus, complex. But they are not, practically speaking,
multi-party cases and they are not necessarily complex. True, there is good
value in having one judge assist with discovery and keeping the parties
focused on an early certification determination, and it is exceedingly
helpful if the judge is familiar with the usual class actions issues; for these
reasons, these cases are usually assigned to judges in complex departments,
which just perpetuates the assignment of those cases to those judges. But,
at least up to trial (and there is almost never a trial), they do not usually
pose complex issue of manageability. However, some class actions benefit
from assignment to complex departments for other reasons—for example,
because they are also deep reach cases.
4. Deep Reach
There are two core characteristics of what I term deep reach cases.
First, the issue reaches deep into an organization, arguably involving many
of its actions and perhaps personnel. The equivalent is a contested divorce
proceeding in a family law department: those cases may involve years of
intimate details of almost every aspect of the family’s life. The
consequence for the civil litigation case is that the scope of permissible
discovery may be very broad, and so it may be very difficult to distinguish
between core and outlier issues. The second characteristic is one I have
mentioned before: a lot of money is at stake. The two characteristics can

91. See, e.g., AmeriGas Propane, LP v. Landstar Ranger, Inc., 179 Cal. Rptr. 3d 330,
342 (Ct. App. 2014) (“Each defendant shall be liable only for the amount of non-economic
damages allocated to that defendant in direct proportion to that defendant’s percentage of
fault, and a separate judgment shall be rendered against that defendant for that amount”
(quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 1341.2 (West 2015))); Arena v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.,
74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 580 (Ct. App. 1998) (analyzing the applicability of Proposition 51).
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be a lethal combination, just as they are in a high stakes, well-funded
divorce action. Typical examples of deep reach cases are antitrust and
some securities fraud cases. Some cases involving valuable family trusts
might also qualify, as do some cases under the state’s Unfair Competition
Practices Act and unfair competition law,92 which attack the essential
manner in which a company interacts with the consuming public.
Defendants in these cases often consider them an attack on their core
structure, almost an existential threat. Discovery is typically one-way,
against defendants, with costs by default borne by defendants, so there are
few economic constraints on discovery (although just reviewing
voluminous paper from defendants is a burden on plaintiffs).
5. Multiple Path
Some cases are characterized by multiple paths which may unfold
together or separately, creating difficult loops and feedback processes.
Some paths may moot others and so may be a waste of time depending on
the outcome of some other path.
Some cases are actually many cases, all of which may or may not
proceed simultaneously. For example, legal malpractice cases often are a
“case within a case,” that is, a plaintiff has to prove both (i) the malpractice
and (ii) that the matter the accused’s attorneys worked on (the underlying
case) would have turned out better than it did. Failure on either prong kills
the case. Some cases, such as construction defect matters, also involve
insurance coverage issues, which may be in a related case or brought in the
case itself. The merits of these two may be intertwined: the existence of
coverage may have a deep impact on how the construction case is
defended—indeed, whether it is defended at all—and of course the merits
of the construction case may be decisive on the scope of duties (especially
indemnity) under the insurance policy.
This loop/feedback pattern may be seen in phases of many cases and
not just complex ones. In general, a party may have a legal position which
if valid authorizes discovery, but discovery may be needed to evaluate the
validity. For example, punitive damages may be sought for malicious or
fraudulent conduct, but plaintiffs may need some discovery in order to
adequately plead the malice or fraud. We may ask whether contract
interpretation requires extrinsic evidence, but we may need extrinsic
evidence before we can answer the question. In class actions, the first
order of business is usually the certification motion, and much time and

92. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17000-17002. See generally Cel-Tech Commc’ns,
Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel. Co., 973 P.2d 527 (Cal. 1999) (discussing both statutes).
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money can be saved if merits discovery is postponed until after certification
because a denial of the motion may moot much of that merits discovery.93
But many class actions settle and the parties usually need merits discovery
in order to present the settlement to the court for approval.94 Percipient
(fact) discovery is usually done before expert discovery because in the
usual case experts rely on the facts. But sometimes expert opinion makes it
clear that more fact discovery is needed (i.e. to impeach or bolster the
expert’s assumptions) and on occasion it is only the expert opinion which,
if valid, justifies the cost of securing fact discovery. For example, assume
plaintiff alleges damages as loss of business opportunities. Plaintiff may
wish to obtain the confidential financial records of dozens of other
companies which an expert says are similar to the plaintiff corporation to
provide a basis for the calculation of damages. If the expert’s theory is
speculative or otherwise invalid, the discovery is a waste of time and
money and risks revealing highly sensitive information to competitors, but
the discovery may be needed in order to evaluate the theory. To evaluate
whether a settlement is in “good faith” so as to cut off other parties’ right to
equitable contribution or indemnity,95 parties opposing the good faith
motion may want discovery of what the settling parties know in order to
show either collusion among them or that the settling parties have severely
underestimated the value of the case.96 But one of the goals in such a
motion is to avoid the cost of litigation including discovery. Anti-SLAPP
motions have two prongs: usually defendants bear the burden of showing
the claims implicate first amendment activity, and then plaintiffs shoulder
the burden of making a prima facie case on merits. As noted above, this is
often done within the confines of a single motion. But some courts may
stagger the treatment of the prongs,97 handling first either prong one98 or

93. Also, a successful certification motion may result in modification of the class
definition, or perhaps only certification of certain issues, which might then confine the
scope of subsequent merits discovery.
94. To grant final approval, the trial court must “independently [satisfy] itself that the
consideration . . . received for the release of the class members’ claims is reasonable in light
of the strengths and weaknesses of the claims and the risks of the particular litigation.”
Kullar v. Foot Locker Retail, Inc., 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 20, 31 (Ct. App. 2008).
95. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6; see Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assocs.,
698 P.2d 159, 166 (Cal. 1985) (providing factors that a court should consider when
determining whether a settlement was made in good faith under § 877.6, such as whether it
was made “within the reasonable range of the settling tortfeasor’s proportional share of
comparative liability for the plaintiff’s injuries”).
96. While the good faith of the settlement is based on what the parties know at the
time, Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 124 Cal. Rptr. 3d 78, 101 (Ct. App. 2011), not
all parties may have the same knowledge.
97. See, e.g., All One God Faith, Inc. v. Organic & Sustainable Indus. Standards, Inc.,
107 Cal. Rptr. 3d 861, 869-72 (Ct. App. 2010) (“bifurcating” the hearing such that the first
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prong two,99 perhaps mooting the other prong.
Because cases have multiple and (often) looped paths, each party may
spend considerable energy jockeying for precedence, seeking to reach a
decisive moment on its issues before the other side does so on its issues. It
is usually not wise to have counsel navigate these procedural options on
their own: judicial direction is required.
VI.

CONTROLS

The mechanisms and types of cases outlined above are aspects of
complex litigation. They are the symptoms of dysfunction in the sense
noted in Section II above, that is, they suggest the need for judicial
supervision. Just as control structures are used to guide complex systems
generally and help ensure they do not explode (sometimes literally) out of
control, courts have developed controls and constraints to manage complex
cases. Some of these can be ordered by the judge, such as the bifurcation
of an issue, staggered discovery, stays, and certain limits on discovery. But
most of these techniques require the cooperation of the lawyers, and that
can be difficult to obtain, surprisingly so given the fact the lawyers asked
for assignment to a complex department in the first place. The reason is,
however, probably straightforward: parties may sign up for efficiencies and
controls in the abstract but not in the specifics, because in each instance a
constraint is likely to be perceived as favoring one side or the other. So
parties will agree that early resolution is preferable to late resolution, but
will object to a specific early trial date because it might not give them
enough time to prepare; they will agree that expedited informal resolution
of discovery disputes is best but not when imposing an onerous, timeconsuming process on the other side might teach the other side a thing or
two. Often, counsel desire complex treatment because the litigation is
literally unmanageable without it, such as the coordination of mass tort

prong was evaluated in the first part of the hearing).
98. Prong two need not be addressed if defendants fail at prong one. Malin v. Singer,
159 Cal. Rptr. 3d 292, 307 (Ct. App. 2013). Parties can ask for discovery, but this will
usually relate to prong two. Thus, if the case can be resolved at prong one, no discovery
may be needed. Garment Workers Ctr. v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 506, 509-10 (Ct.
App. 2004). The trial court in one case never reached the second prong—but the Court of
Appeal did. Schwarzburd v. Kensington Police Prot. & Cmty. Servs. Dist. Bd., 170 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 899, 905, 908 (Ct. App. 2014).
99. See, e.g., S. Cal. Gas Co. v. Flannery, 181 Cal. Rptr. 3d 436, 442-43 (Ct. App.
2014); Hardin v. PDX, Inc., 173 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397, 403 (Ct. App. 2014)(utilizing only the
second prong). If there is a prima facie case under prong two, it does not matter if the prong
one first amendment concerns are implicated—the motion will be denied. S. Cal. Gas Co.,
181 Cal. Rptr. 3d, at 442-43.
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claims, but this may not signal counsel’s willingness to otherwise submit to
judicial control. Sometimes, lawyers have no idea why they signed up for
complex treatment.100 (This note is for them.)
A. Constraints
First, we begin with a series of constraints. Each of these techniques
can be seen as a constraint, or providing direction, but with very different
emphases. The first set—stays and phasing—breaks the case apart into
defined pieces, in effect uncoupling the parts. The second—time limits—
makes it more likely the parties will use the time for the principal issues
and reduces the odds of wasting time on outliers. The third—sanctions—
identifies and presumably stops bad behavior; but there are also discovery
sanctions, which have no moral opprobrium and are designed, again, just to
reduce the odds of spending time on outliers.
1. Stays & Phasing
General stays are rare. They are done because there is a pending
appeal101 or because some other process will, or is likely to, entirely resolve
the case. For example, the court case might be stayed pending arbitration
or because events in a related case—say, an MDL case—are likely to prove
decisive because (1) settlement in the related case will include the local
case or (2) discovery in the related case will generally take care of the
discovery needs in the local case.
More common are partial stays, designed to—in effect—phase or
bifurcate events. In a class action, a judge might allow discovery solely on
certification issues and wait until certification has been granted to allow
more general discovery on the merits. Where an anti-SLAPP motion has
been brought, the statute itself blocks all discovery except to the extent the
judge believes discovery is needed to decide that motion. Similarly, where
a motion to quash service of summons on the basis that the court has no
personal jurisdiction over the defendant has been made, the court may
allow some discovery on the jurisdictional issues. The court might also
block discovery pending the resolution of demurrers to the complaint
(motions to dismiss as they are called in federal court).

100. I recall an initial case management conference when I asked the lawyers, as I
usually do, what they had in mind for the progress of the case. They told me they would
like to do some percipient discovery, take a few expert depositions, file a summary
judgment motion, and then have a jury trial. They did not know what to say when I asked
them why they were in a complex department.
101. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 916 (West 2015).
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Without phasing, all issues are subject to simultaneous investigation,
discovery and dispute; all issues are to be resolved towards the end of the
case via motion for summary judgment, trial, or settlement. Phasing selects
an issue or two, permits investigation of those all with a view towards an
early resolution of the issue. That early resolution might actually resolve
the case as a whole, such as when it deals with standing, statutes of
limitations, the existence of damages, and so on, or it might nevertheless
have such an impact on the parties that it helps settle the case. For
example, one might decide a statutory defense, the scope of duties, whether
there is a basis for punitive damages, the retroactive application of a law,
whether a witness can be compelled to testify over an assertion of privilege,
whether extrinsic evidence will be heard, if attorney’s fees can be
recovered, or otherwise the applicable law. There are many fora for these
determinations: an early jury instruction conference to decide the law, early
motions in limine to decide the admissibility of evidence (such as whether
an expert will be allowed to express an opinion—often a decisive issue), a
bifurcated bench trial on any of these issues, as well as the usual (if more
painful) mechanism of summary adjudication of issues. Pending the
resolution of the issue, the court might stop all other discovery and other
efforts, or some of those.
In these ways, phasing creates an early inflection point—the EIP I
discussed in Section IV above. Multiple phases create multiple EIPs.
Another sort of phasing is so–called reverse bifurcation, by which one first
decides if there are any damages at all, or the amount of them, without (as
is usual) first treating the issues of liability. Knowing the actual value of
the case can further settlement: it is another EIP.102
Phasing is also used to tailor the subsequent event, if not to avoid it.
For example, one might phase a class certification motion. Typically,
when all class (and sometimes other) discovery is done, the parties brief the
motion as usual: opening briefs, opposition, reply, and a hearing. But one
can also have the opening papers filed first without much discovery, take a
pause to see what discovery, if any, is needed by defendants, do that, file
the opposition, take a pause to see what discovery, if any, is needed by
plaintiff’s counsel to respond to the opposition, file the reply, and then have
the hearing. The advantage is that discovery is only done if the other side,
in its papers, made it pertinent. So one does not frantically go about
discovery because of positions one is afraid the other side might take, but
only because the other side has in fact taken a position on some factual
issue. This artfully cabins the scope of relevant discovery and, not

102. See generally Drury Stevenson, Reverse Bifurcation, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 213 (2006)
(explaining how reverse bifurcation encourages settlement).
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incidentally, makes it almost impossible to object to the discovery
demanded by the other side.
Phasing decouples issues. Instead of leaving the resolution of all
uncertainties until the last moment, it progressively resolves one
uncertainty after the next, without having to undertake the entire costs of
litigation. In this way, it also avoids the shock wave effect, probably
allowing more time per issue, and so a greater likelihood of getting it right.
It creates EIPs. It may reduce the costs of litigation by removing issues
from the case. It can help avoid inadvertent failure: without phasing, the
parties generally find out about gaps in their evidence and analysis only at
trial, long after it is too late to do anything about it. With phasing,
problems are evident far earlier, and the parties at least have the chance to
ask the judge for more time, or another shot. Just as it is wise to take
potentially dangerous complex systems (such as nuclear reactors and space
ships) and decouple the sequence of events, make them more loosely
interactive,103 so too there are real benefits in phasing complex litigation.
There are, of course, disadvantages. Most importantly, phasing may
lengthen the time of the litigation. Phasing class certification motions
injects substantial delays between the opening briefs and the hearing
(although if one counts the time needed for discovery for a non-phased
motion it might be about the same). Writs, and sometimes appeals, may be
taken after a phase, and this may inject literally years of delay. In busy trial
courts, calendaring a series of bifurcated trials involving a lot of lawyers
may create enormous delays, more so than setting a single, final trial. A
case I inherited from another judge has gone through three phased bench
trials over nine years.
Phasing usually blocks discovery on an issue not yet deemed ripe. But
it might be far more efficient to take on the entire discovery at once: most
obviously, phasing such that witnesses are repeatedly deposed, or
documents are repeatedly produced from the same repositories or
custodians, may be grotesquely inefficient.
Phasing segregates issues, and so the parties are unable to, in effect,
borrow from one issue to reinforce a weakness in a different issue; this can
strip away useful, and sometimes essential, context and background. For
example, it is difficult to segregate liability from the bases for punitive
damages: the same acts are probably at issue. In a construction defect case,
the liability of a subcontractor, although in the abstract different from that
of the general contractor, probably cannot be evaluated in isolation. There
is also the “halo effect,” whereby great strength on one issue—for example,

103. See Perrow, NORMAL ACCIDENTS, supra note 47, at 88, 96-97 (noting the risks
associated with complex, as opposed to linear, systems).
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severe injury such as death in a car accident—might unconsciously
influence a jury’s determination on fault.104 I do not suggest this is a valid
reason to object to phasing, but it explains why lawyers might object.
Finally, as discussed above,105 staggering or phasing creates costs by
forcing attention onto issues which otherwise would be ignored.
2. Time Limits
Nothing, nothing controls a case better than setting a reasonable trial
date as early as possible—and ensuring the date does not move. This in
effect sets time limits for all pretrial work, including discovery and
motions, such as for summary judgment. Only a credible trial date works
this way. To be credible, the judge must confer with the lawyers and
understand what is really needed to get the case ready. While setting a trial
date early in the case is simple in a routine case, it is far more difficult in
complex litigation because the parties cannot advise on how much time it
will take to be prepared. They don’t know. The pendency of related cases
(such as a MDL), the future need for discovery, and other uncertainties,
which depend on the outcome of earlier phases or events, contribute to this
uncertainty. In one case, I was unable to set a firm trial date because the
defendants did not know what discovery would be needed, which in turn
was a function of the plaintiffs’ inability to fully specify all the bad acts
they wished to pursue. This was a function of the fact that the plaintiffs did
not know all the acts the defendants had undertaken or what, if any, basis
the defendants had had for undertaking those acts (a key issue which made
the acts legitimate or not), which in turn required some preliminary
discovery from the defendants.
There is a trap here, though. Just insisting on an early trial date might
telescope pretrial work and so aggravate the shock wave effect. A recent
case settled only a few days before trial, and after enormous work on
pretrial motions, jury instructions, witness preparation, and the like. When
I asked why the case has not settled earlier, the lawyers told me the trial
104. I am using the term “halo effect” here far more broadly than is usual to suggest that
views on one issue can irrationally affect one’s conclusions about an unrelated issue. More
properly and commonly, it describes people’s conclusions on, for example, a subject’s
intelligence, competence, or moral status based just on how the subject looks. See, e.g.,
Charles W. Murdock & Barry Sullivan, What Kahneman Means for Lawyers: Some
Reflections on Thinking, Fast and Slow, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1377, 1391-92 (2013)
(Describing the “halo effect” as “[t]he tendency to extrapolate from one or more positive (or
negative) characteristics, and to like (or dislike) everything about a person.”); see also
Curtis Karnow, Deciding, 55 THE BENCH 10 (Spring 2015) (noting that biases or
impressions may impede rational decision making).
105. See supra p. 47.
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date had been set too close to the end of discovery, and the parties had not
had the opportunity to evaluate their position before rushing headlong into
trial preparation. The lesson here is to consider shifting back in time the
close of percipient and expert discovery—discussed next.
One may set early dates for the close of percipient and expert
discovery. By default in the California courts, these are set by reference to
the trial date, and expert discovery takes place shortly before trial. In
complex litigation this is often unwise: experts may be key, early expert
discovery is likely to provide an EIP, the value of which is lost the closer to
trial expert discovery takes place. Also, trial preparation is extremely
difficult, more so for complex litigation, and collapsing all expert discovery
into the two months before trial often creates chaos. In complex cases, the
parties are more likely to have disagreements on expert discovery, asserting
surprise and the need for modifications to the usual rules. In some cases,
the California default of simultaneous expert disclosure should be replaced
by staggered expert discovery in order to ensure the right issues are
confronted.
Time allocations for trials should be fixed, or the parties should be
told that such limits will be set, or refined, as trial approaches based among
other things on the parties’ witness lists. When the trial is set, a certain
number of days will be set aside, and in busy courtrooms the dates after
that trial will probably be filled with other cases. In other words, when a
trial is set, the length of the trial is also fixed, and the parties must be
expressly told that their case will have to fit within that schedule. The
amount of time available for each side is always far, far less than the parties
unconsciously think they will have. Time estimates accompanying witness
lists frequently would require a trial three or four times the number of days
originally set aside. But lawyers often have a very difficult time shifting
from pretrial to trial thinking. They have this problem because, by and
large, they are not trial lawyers; they are pre-trial lawyers, and complex
cases almost never go to trial. The difference between trial and pretrial
thinking is vast. Pretrial has an expansive focus ranging out to every issue,
including every edge issue and outlier that conceivably might be of any
assistance in the case, limited solely by objections of the other party and
the judge, and cost (and when there is a lot of money involved, not even
that). Pretrial work in complex cases routinely involves discovery that
involves millions of documents, scores (or more) of witnesses, motions
comprising hundreds of pages, many hundreds of written objections, and so
on. Entire rainforests are destroyed to feed the beast of pretrial work.
Jury trials are different: juries can be expected to absorb a handful of
exhibits, relatively few witness will be called and extreme attention is
required to fit the case into the time allocated; core issues finally come
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front and center, the outliers cast away. If pretrial is the use of vast nets,
trial is surgery with a scalpel. The point is not to prescribe trial rules here,
but that a focus on the needs of trial may help circumscribe and focus
pretrial work. Setting trial time allocations, noting a chess clock will be
used to track that time,106 and frequent allusions to gathering what is needed
for trial, assists this focus (it also reduces the odds of misery in those cases
that do go to trial).
3. Sanctions
Sanctions inhibit bad behavior if the lawyers think the court will
employ them. The routine type of sanctions is the fee-shifting sanctions
common in discovery motions. The Legislature requires that these
sanctions be imposed on the losing party (or if there is no meet and confer
in advance of the motion) unless the losing party took a reasonable, even if
ultimately unsuccessful, position.107 There are as well sanctions for
discovery abuse, which is entirely different. In these cases, a party has
violated the rules such as by withholding documents when it said it had
turned everything over. Those sanctions can be fines, evidence preclusion,
and if a party refuses to comply with a court order, terminating sanctions—
the other side is deemed to have won the suit. And finally, there are
sanctions generally for taking frivolous positions108 and violating rules.109
These sanctions are meant to block time-wasting frivolous positions,
but as with many weapons, their efficacy is best found in the threat and not
the actual use. Some judges may impose sanctions (if appropriate) early
on, hoping to send a message that will smooth out the rest of the case, and
fee-shifting discovery sanctions may have to be imposed under the
statutory directive when a losing position has no substance. But there are
106. See, e.g., United States v. Reaves, 636 F. Supp. 1575, 1580 (E.D. Ky. 1986)
(discussing the benefits of setting time limits).
107. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE. §§ 2030.300(d), 2031.320(b), 2032.260(b) (West
2015) (providing for monetary sanctions relating to making or opposing discovery motions).
108. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128.5 (West 2015); see also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §
128.7 (West 2015) (describing bad faith pleadings).
109. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 177.5 (West 2015) (providing for violation of court
order); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 575.2 (West 2015) (providing for sanctions for violating
local rules); see also CAL. R. CT. 2.30 (sanctioning violations of rules of court). There are
other sorts of sanctions unique to certain motions or procedures. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 2033.420 (West 2015) (imposing sanctions after wrongful denial of requests for
admission); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 473(b)–(c)(1) (West 2015) (sanctions on set aside of
default); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 437(c),(j) (West 2015) (same regarding default judgment
or dismissal); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 396b(b) (West 2015) (sanctions in favor of
prevailing party on motionfor transfer of venue); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1209, 1218
(West 2015) (providing for sanctions for contempt of court).
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so many other ways judges have to send messages of disapproval that,
generally speaking, sanctions are treated as an ultimate recourse.
There are disadvantages to using sanctions as a routine means to
control litigation. First, they take time, that is, time away from the real
work of the case. They require additional briefing, and perhaps additional
hearings. This is satellite litigation, and it’s a distraction. Second, issues
which may look like outliers—a red flag signaling pointless litigation and
perhaps a frivolous position—may turn out to be of real significance
especially in complex litigation when commonly the significance of issues
ripens as the case progresses. Concomitantly, the threat of sanctions may
cut off inquiries that may have led to something interesting. Finally, some
judges think an award of sanctions injures the environment of collaboration
they seek to create, pushing the case back to the bad old model of
aggressive, antagonistic combat. By this reasoning, one award of sanctions
inevitably generates a reciprocal demand for sanctions from the side that
paid the first award; and then, there is no end to it.
B. Focusing Devices
In this category I briefly discuss a variety of options that help the
judge and the parties focus their energies on what is truly at issue. Some of
these are somewhat artificial, such as page limits. Others really do
eliminate unnecessary disputes because they require adequate
communications: a goal so often missed by counsel.
• In cases with many parties, the court can appoint (or have the
parties select) a liaison, lead, or coordinating counsel.
Obviously this works best when the fundamental interests of
the allied parties are the same, but liaison counsel can still
help funnel debate for parties with somewhat diverse
positions. Papers filed by liaison counsel can state the areas
of agreement and avoid repetition.
• Formally (as a result of a motion), or informally at say a case
management conference, the court can require the filing of
what I think of as a “bill of particulars.” These are
specifications, the details of a claim (or defense) which while
sufficiently unambiguous to pass muster on pleading rules and
so avoid demurrer, nevertheless are so confusing or vague that
it is difficult to know what discovery might be useful. The
same information can probably be secured through wellcrafted contention interrogatories, but my own view is that if I
cannot manage a case because I do not understand the claims
and oral discussion with counsel is not helpful, a written
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specification can be of great assistance.
Educate the judge.
In cases that depend on a good
understanding of a technology or unusual industry, it can be
helpful to set aside some time early on in the case to educate
the judge. Perhaps experts will be present. It will likely be
off the record to provide maximum flexibility to the parties
and not have them fear some slip early on in the case will
come back to haunt them. Such a hearing will not only help
the judge make better informed decisions, but it may also
obviate the natural and sometimes unconscious desire of
lawyers to file motions, such as preliminary injunctions and
summary judgment motions, to “educate” the judge and prime
him or her to be receptive to their later positions on the merits.
And not incidentally, these events compel the parties to focus
on the specifically relevant aspects of the technology or
industry, including requisite experts that are really likely to be
important to the case.
Limit motions. Nothing focuses the mind as much as page or
word limits. The phase attributed to many, “I have made this
longer than usual because I have not had time to make it
shorter,” reflects the discipline needed to make writing tight
and to the point (I have generally regretted granting
permission for oversized briefs). Some federal judges bar
motions such as discovery motions without prior permission,
and some courts have limits on the number of motions in
limine that can be filed.
Meet and confer requirements. These are widely seen as
effective, and indeed the requirement is written into
California’s discovery code. It reflects the sense that many
disputes are misunderstandings, and my “one-shot” discovery
procedure (discussed just below), which forces the parties to
further meet and confer, frequently reduces the scope of
disputes (the informal conferences I discuss below also are
premised on this).
Some judges insist, or strongly
recommend, parties confer on demurrers so that the plaintiff
can fix the fixable problems, and when the complaint is finally
challenged, it is likely the best complaint there can be,
avoiding the all-to-frequent result of repeatedly sustaining
demurrers with leave to amend.110 Parties may also be asked

110. Law effective January 1, 2016 mandates meet-and-confer on demurrers in
California. S. 383, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015).
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to confer on areas for expert disclosure and other discovery,
such as agreeing to limits on depositions and presumptive
limits on the number of interrogatories. More generally, there
is a significant premium in complex cases on getting past the
cartoon image of the contentious lawyer. Much of the work
done in complex courts is procedural, and there, at least, as
the parties and the judge find their way through sometimes
unfamiliar territory, there is a need to act cooperatively,
leaving the fights to the substance of the dispute.111
• Discovery. Because so much of what the parties do is
discovery, I use this rubric to discuss a variety of focusing
devices.
First, for reasons I have alluded to above, early close of discovery will
limit the opportunities for peripheral and relatively useless demands.
Second, the parties may agree or the court may order limits on the
number of depositions, interrogatories, and so on. This can be effective but
it can also drive up costs if the parties need to come into court to get relief
from the limits when the unexpected happens.
Third, I encourage the use of the “one-shot” procedure, which replaces
the cumbersome, expensive formal discovery motion contemplated by state
law, with its classic tripartite briefing (opening, opposition and reply
papers), separate statements of facts, notice of motion, and (often) a long
series of attachments. The formal motion usually has the same arguments
repeated ad nauseam in the separate statement, in every single interrogatory
or document demand at issue (which could number in the dozens or
hundreds even when it is exactly the same argument), and then again in the
accompanying memorandum of points and authorities. The opposition then
does the same thing. In a one-shot, the parties pass one document back and
forth, inserting their position on the dispute——but only once. They
continue to exchange the document among themselves until they have
satisfactorily responded to the other’s points, just as a majority opinion and
dissent will revise their drafts until each is satisfied it has addressed what it
desires of the other side’s stance. The very act of passing the one-shot draft
between the parties is a “meet and confer” and many issues may drop out.
When I get the submission, I read each side’s position——once and only
on what is in dispute. I can usually get an order out resolving the matter
within a few days.
Fourth, courts should use cost-shifting to help resolve discovery
battles over the burden of production when the value of the discovery is

111. See generally Jay Tidmarsh, Civil Procedure: The Last Ten Years, 46 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 503, 505 (1996) (discussing a departure from adversarial rules for complex cases).
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marginal. That is, while the default rule is that producing parties are
responsible for the costs of production, judges should consider transferring
the burden to the demanding party.112 For example, cost shifting may be
proper when a party requests to have electronically stored information
translated into a reasonably useable format.113 There may be difficult
questions of affordability, and courts of course may hesitate to shift the
burden when the practical effect would be to deny the discovery; but again
the issue will generally be considered in the context of discovery of
marginal utility.
Fifth, judges can encourage a series of informal procedures; the oneshot is an example (although the submission and order are filed and so
reviewable on appeal). Other informal procedures include telephone
rulings on objections (specifically, instructions not to answer questions)
during depositions——thereby avoiding costly motions and possibly
renewed depositions——and informal off the record discovery conferences
where practical issues can be hashed out and misunderstandings can be
resolved.
Sixth, expedited discovery devices are especially useful when many
parties provide similar information. For example, in many mass tort cases,
all plaintiffs fill out a questionnaire on the facts of their exposure to the
alleged toxin, medical history, names of treating doctors, drugs taken,
prognosis, and so on, without the necessity of formal demands and
responses.

112. Philip J. Favro et al., New Utah Rule 26: A Blueprint for Proportionality Under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 933, 958 (2012) (“[C]ost-shifting
is imposed for disproportionate ESI discovery, particularly for over-discovery of email.
Given the high costs associated with the production of email and the infrequent use of such
evidence at trial, the Order places sweeping restrictions on its discovery.”) (footnotes
omitted).
113. See OpenTV v. Liberate Techs., 219 F.R.D. 474, 478 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (“A
responding party should not be required to pay for the production of inaccessible electronic
data if the cost of such production is significantly disproportionate to the value of the case,
i.e. disproportionately expensive discovery warrants cost-shifting.” (citing Zubulake v. UBS
Warburg LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2003))); Toshiba Am. Elec. Components,
Inc. v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d 532, 541(Ct. App. 2004) (“By enacting the costshifting clause of section 2031(g)(1) our Legislature has identified the expense of translating
data compilations into usable form as one that, in the public’s interest, should be placed
upon the demanding party.”) The classic statement is from Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC,
217 F.R.D. 309, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“A court should consider cost-shifting only when
electronic data is relatively inaccessible, such as in backup tapes.”) (emphasis in original).
Since, cases have used a variety of criteria to decide when to impose cost shifting. See
generally Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. v. Michelson, 229 F.R.D. 550, 553 (W.D. Tenn.
2003) (adopting an eight factor balancing test to determine whether cost shifting is undue.);
Amy Longo et al., Current Trends In Electronic Discovery in TRIAL EVIDENCE IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS: PROBLEM AND SOLUTIONS (2005) (collecting cases on cost shifting).
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C. Speedier and Simpler Procedures
I collect here devices and procedures many of which could as easily
be thought of as focusing mechanisms, because a device that simplifies
generally helps focus the judge and the lawyers on the important issues.
The simplest approach is to do nothing at all. When the parties are
engaged in a different forum and the heavy lifting of discovery and
resolution of key issues will be conducted there, the best approach may be
to stay the local proceedings, as long as events in the other forum seem to
be moving at a reasonable speed.
But otherwise, speed is key.
Complex litigation is notoriously slow. Each of the many moving
parts——the large number of parties and lawyers, issues, related cases, and
documents——tend to turn the case into a quivering gelatinous mass. To
be sure, complex litigation moves, but not in any particular direction.
Many lawyers are cautious and do not wish to proceed until they are
satisfied they have every possible contingency covered and every piece of
information they may need to prevail. Frequently the other side will object
to moving on the very same grounds, i.e., until the other side has done so.
These self-inhibiting loops are manifest at the most mundane level. For
example, Alice might ask Bob for the evidence that supports Bob’s
position. Bob answers that he cannot do so until he sees the evidence he
has demanded from Alice. Or, after the discovery deadline, Bob makes a
motion for summary judgment (which might end the case), and Alice
objects that she needs more discovery to respond.114 Bob argues she should
have secured the evidence before, and Alice retorts she did not know what
would be at issue until she saw Bob’s motion. This stand-off either
threatens the previously firm trial date or destroys Bob’s right to have his
motion heard——likely delaying the case.
Delay is the default in most litigation, and most especially in complex
litigation. Thus, one of the most important things a judge can do, from the
first case management conference on, is to act very rapidly while allowing
the parties a fair chance to be heard. This sets expectations by example.
The one-shot procedure discussed above carries this out. For the same
reason, judges should issue orders as fast as practicable and have the parties
rapidly complete their meet-and-confer on discovery disputes, sending the
message that interminable exchange of letters and emails to prove good
faith meetings is not necessary; as soon as the parties have conferred on all
issues, the motion (or other procedure) should be instigated. By the same
token, judges should be wary of extended briefing schedules stipulated to

114. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 437c(h) (West 2015).
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by the parties unless there are very good reasons for those.
Summary judgment can be difficult for reasons to which I have
alluded. The procedure has many parts and each has to go just right to
allow the judge to reach the merits of the motion. Any dispute on a
material fact is likely to torpedo the motion. The procedure is also liable to
severe abuse: parties sometimes file many hundreds of (or more)
objections.115 The parties may be better served with a bifurcated bench trial
at which the judge can rule on disputed facts if it turns out that there is such
a dispute. Bench trials can be expedited with the use of depositions and
declarations on direct,116 allowing a party to cross-examine any witness live
in court. Another restriction on state court summary adjudication practice
is that the motion must dispose of an entire cause of action, type of
damages, or duty; but frequently there is some key fact or legal dispute the
resolution of which would rapidly advance the case——perhaps to
settlement——but does not fit nicely into these permitted categories of
motions. Again, a bifurcated bench trial——which may take a matter of
hours or a day——can be arranged to resolve these issues.117 Bench trials
are so important in complex litigation that I discuss them separately below.
Whether for jury or bench trials, the parties should be encouraged to
make stipulations and have the trial focus solely on the core disputes.
Thus, the parties should agree on the exhibits to be introduced, or at least
their authenticity. Summaries of voluminous exhibits should be stipulated
to, and at least with juries, those summaries should be used at trial instead
of the underlying documents.
115. In Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc., 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 296 (Ct. App. 2009), 764
objections were made over 350 pages. The judge was confronted with 3000 pages of
materials for this one motion. See also Cole v. Town of Los Gatos, 140 Cal. Rptr.3d 722,
781 n.6 (Ct. App. 2012) (“[W]here a trial court is confronted on summary judgment with a
large number of nebulous evidentiary objections, a fair sample of which appear to be
meritless, the court can properly overrule . . . all of the objections on the ground that they
constitute oppression of the opposing party and an imposition on the resources of the
court.”) (emphasis in original). Remarkably, parties have a statutory right to bypass written
objections and at the hearing—after the judge has read everything and likely has a tentative
view of the merits—rise in court and make all the objections they want orally. CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE §§ 437c(b)(5), 437c(d); CAL. R. CT. 3.1352(2). However, lawyers rarely take
this measure. In an amendment to California’s controlling statute CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 437c, effective January 1, 2016, judges will only be required to rule on objections material
to the motion.
116. Where more than e.g. 250 testimony pages are submitted, a summary (a couple of
pages, maximum) should also be provided.
117. California experimented with what was designated CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 437c(s), subject to a sunset provision effective January 2015. This permitted the parties
and the court to agree to resolve any issue via the summary judgment/adjudication
procedures. The statute has been resurrected as § 437c(t) effective January 2016.The parties
can secure similar benefits through a bifurcated bench trial.
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Judges may use case management conferences and informal off-therecord conferences to resolve a host of disagreements on a highly expedited
basis. Some issues truly need formal briefing, but without court
intervention, all issues will be formally briefed, using up to a month to do
what could be done in five minutes at a conference. Such issues as
discovery sequencing and associated stays, protective orders, perhaps
misjoinder, and the general scope of discovery, may be treated this way,
assuming no party seriously objects. An informal conference can be
especially useful where discovery disputes do not raise a substantial legal
issue (such as privilege or privacy) but rather practical problems about
timing and burden.
In the spirit of encouraging the model of cooperation over the old
forms of combat among lawyers, courts are suggesting and sometimes
requiring parties to confer, or meet with the judge, in pre-motion
conferences.118 There, the parties might agree on abridging lengthy notice
periods for motions; determine whether, in advance of filing a summary
judgment motion, any discovery issues remain (and avoid California Code
of Civil Procedure section 437c(h) problems); seek clarity on decisive legal
issues; and agree to facts and the admissibility of evidence. My earlier
suggestion of conferences in advance of demurrers has a similar rationale.
Traditionally, a series of critical events takes place just before trial.
Generally, there is a reason for this: the parties do not have information
they need to engage earlier. But sometimes they do; the speedier, earlier
attention to these issues may create EIPs and——if the trial is to go
forward——helps the court and parties prepare with less uncertainty, which
in turn helps avoid the shock wave effect. These critical events are: jury
instructions, expert admissibility, and other important evidentiary rulings.
In a simple civil case, these events may be treated the day before the jury is
picked. In more complex cases, these events can be handled months in
advance of trial. An early jury instruction conference is a splendid way for
118. “We also encourage judges to hold premotion conferences before summaryjudgment motions are filed and fully briefed. Here, the question is less one of whether any
motion will be filed but of the scope of what gets filed and briefed. We and others have
noted elsewhere that summary-judgment motions are routinely over-briefed, often by both
the moving and responding parties. All too often they are ‘kitchen sink’ affairs that address
every claim and defense, raise every possible issue, and set forth page after page of fact
assertions on even the tiniest details, all of which then requires volumes of ‘supporting’
exhibits. And yet in most cases, the motion will turn on a fraction of that content. So why
is it all there? Uncertainty and its cousin, anxiety. The fear of being second-guessed
(colloquially known as ‘CYA’) looms large here. Absent any guidance from the judge, the
parties cannot know in advance what will matter. The only safe strategy is to hit every
conceivable target with all of the ammunition available.” Steven S. Gensler & Lee H.
Rosenthal, Four Years After Duke: Where Do We Stand on Calibrating the Pretrial
Process?, 18 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 643, 668 (2014) (footnotes omitted).
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the judge to indicate her thoughts on key legal issues, including some of
which may require substantial briefing on such issues as choice of law or
the construction of a new statute. An early conference may surface a
discussion on whether an issue is truly for the jury or the court. The
lawyer’s choice of trial strategy may depend on these views from the court.
Early ruling on whether an expert can provide a certain opinion may in
effect decide the case and result in an early settlement.
Many judges have standing orders, guidelines, or the equivalent. I
do.119 Their function is to clear the underbrush and avoid debate on
incidental procedural issues. As with indications that certain motions in
limine are usually granted (such as those barring mention of settlement
discussions, bifurcation of punitive damages, and so on), these guidelines
act as default decisions, rapidly disposing of common procedural problems.
They also set a tone, form expectations favoring quick informal resolutions,
and offer options for reaching such resolutions. This avoids friction.
However, there is a danger: in some cases not susceptible to the defaults,
time and money is spent to avoid them. Lawyers may need an additional
hearing or make separate arguments to show that their situation is not
contemplated by these defaults; and that too is friction.
D. Early Trial types
Parties need not wait for the usual trial of all issues at the end of the
usual pursuit of discovery and the usual panoply of pretrial motions. Three
alternatives are worth mentioning: bifurcated bench trials, bellwether cases,
and expedited jury trials. The first is the subject of separate discussion
below, Section F.
The second approach is a bellwether case.120 This is used generally in
mass tort actions. One case, or a few cases, are picked for trial and the
results are used to guide settlement of the rest of the cases. Of course the
bellwether cases must be representative of the rest of the cases. In some
caseloads, a case or two may obviously be representative because there are
no strongly disparate fact patterns. In other caseloads, the facts are widely
divergent——some cases are patently very good for one side or the other.
It is simple to select a case from the first type of caseload. As to the

119. User’s Manual for Department 304 (July 2015) (on file with author),
http://www.sfsuperiorcourt.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/Fireside%20chat%20July%202015.pd
f, archived at http://perma.cc/KEL7-8CH4
120. Loren H. Brown et al., Bellwether Trial Selection in Multi-District Litigation:
Empirical Evidence in Favor of Random Selection, 47 AKRON L. REV. 663, 665 (2014);
Zachary B. Savage, Scaling Up: Implementing Issue Preclusion in Mass Tort Litigation
Through Bellwether Trials, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 439, 442 (2013).
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second, typically the parties agree on one of a variety of mechanisms: try
two cases—— one presenting a strong case for each side——to learn the
potential outside limits of the value of the rest of the caseload,121 and (or)
use a randomly selected case from a small group which each side has been
able to modify by striking those cases seen to be highly favorable to the
other side. Depending on which facts are thought to be outcome
determinative, it may also be possible to undertake “stratified random
sampling, an established statistical procedure for selecting predictive
groups” to generate suitable bellwether trials.122 The use of bellwether
trials requires faith that juries will share the parties’ views of which facts
drive verdicts. Sometimes they do not, and the verdicts are not predictable
even after a series of trials.123
Expedited jury trials are something of an experiment in California.124
Under law as modified for 2016, eight jurors are selected, each side gets
five hours for trial, and the case is done within a day or two. The bases for
appeal are limited. Originally developed for simple cases such as minor
traffic accidents and contract disputes, the model can be used for anything
the parties desire. With a cooperative judge, the time for trial can be
extended, a couple of alternate jurors used, and other modifications may be
had. For complex litigation, this model allows the parties to slice off a key
fact issue as to which one side or the other insists on a jury determination,
and have it very rapidly dealt with long before the parties must gear up for
the ultimate (and very expensive) trial.
E. Special Master
Outside professionals, often but not always lawyers, can be of great
use in some cases. Typically the label “special masters” suggests they are
121. Joseph F. Madonia & Anthony G. Hopp, Case Management Techniques in
Complex Tort Litigation, 17 NAT. RES. & ENV’T, 238, 241 (2003).
122. Richard O. Faulk et. al., Building A Better Mousetrap? A New Approach to Trying
Mass Tort Cases 29 TEX. TECH L. REV. 779, 784, 796 (1998). As this article suggests, a
critical premise of bellwether trials is that the important facts for all the cases are wellknown (that the litigation is “mature”); otherwise it is probably impossible to speak of a
“representative” cases at all. See also Eldon E. Fallon et al., Bellwether Trials in
Multidistrict Litigation, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2323, 2344 (2008) (discussing that separately from
the use of bellwether trials to set the stage for settlement is the issue of preclusive effect of
the first trial on the others).
123. Peter H. Schuck, Judicial Avoidance of Juries in Mass Tort Litigation, 48 DEPAUL
L. REV. 479, 484-85 (1998).
124. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE. §§ 630.01–630.12 (West 2015); CAL. R. CT. 3.1545–
3.1552. As of January 1, 2016, the provisions as modified will continue in force. As of
2016, many “limited” cases (where the demand is for less than $25,000) must be tried under
these provisions. Assemb. 555, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal 2015).
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acting on behalf of and are responsible to the court. But that term does not
have technical meaning in California state courts. Instead, the court may
appoint or endorse the parties’ use of a referee.125 There is considerably
more flexibility to do this in a complex case,126 and typically referees are
used for two purposes: manage discovery and settlement.127 In some cases,
and especially construction defect litigation, the referee does both, almost
always at the behest of the parties. In some cases, the referee may be
needed to review, for example, enormous quantities of documents which
are the focus of a discovery dispute. In certain areas, such as construction
defect litigation, these referees are highly efficient— and it is just for that
reason the parties want them. It can be easier to get more time from a
referee, and at a convenient time for the lawyers.128 Otherwise, their use is
discouraged.129 There are at least three reasons. First, the courts ought to
be handling judicial work; it is peculiar to make the parties pay for what is
an essential service of the state. (I distinguish the imposition of these costs
on a party responsible for some abusive tactic which made it necessary to
hire a referee.) Second, it may be awkward where one or more parties
cannot afford the referee; and if one side pays all the expenses, that
generates its own awkward problem, a problem of optics, we might say.130
Third, a discovery dispute hearing should be thought of as a potential case
management conference, an opportunity to have further helpful discussions
and perhaps intervention from the court; for the fight might actually have
been sparked by some other covert but systemic problem. Farming out all
the discovery disputes gives up one good technique of tracking the progress
of the case.
F. Bench trials
First, a few words on complexity at trial. In many “complex
litigation” cases, the complexity is not at trial so much as it is in pretrial

125. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 638 (West 2015).
126. See Weil et al., supra note 70, at ¶ 12:47.9a (discussing the use of referees in
complex cases).
127. A court may not require parties to submit to mediation conducted by a referee.
CAL. R. CT. 3.920(b). But the parties can opt to have anyone conduct a mediation, and in
some cases they ask the “special master” to do so.
128. See Terry Friedman (J., ret.), “The Appointment of Discovery Referees in Complex
Litigation,” L.A. LAW. 23 (Oct. 2011) (discussing the benefits with using a discovery
referee).
129. See Taggares v. Superior Court, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 387 (Ct. App. 1998) (discussing
the utility of using a discovery referee).
130. Id., at 397 (holding that, even though the plaintiff is indigent, the defendant cannot
be ordered to pay the entire referee fee).
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management (so this note has focused on pretrial, not trial work). By the
time a construction defect case gets to trial, there may only be left the
relatively modest claims of a general contractor against a single
subcontractor; a mass tort trial might present relatively simple allegations
that one drug affected one patient. A class action which is not certified
might end up as a small claims action with a single plaintiff. As a result, it
may be wise to de-complexify a case when there is nothing left to warrant
more than routine judicial handling.
Nevertheless, jury trials are more complicated than bench trials (in my
last example, the small claims case ends up as a bench trial in any event).
Bench trials allow the judge to decide the key issues in the case in a less
formal and constrained venue than the jury trial. A bifurcated bench trial
allows the parties to peel out a key issue and have it resolved early in the
case. It is a powerful phasing mechanism, and may go far, very far, in
reducing uncertainty. For this reason some parties will embrace it, and
others will not. If the issue at stake is entitled to a jury trial, the only thing
a judge can do is order a bifurcated jury trial. In most instances, the parties
must agree to the bench trial; indeed, as the first sentence of this paragraph
suggests, it is exactly where a jury right exists that the bench trial is so
promising from a management perspective.131
The bench trial, as such, is a control. It helps govern not only trial, but
pre-trial actions for the following reasons.
First, bench trials tend to minimize the pursuit of discovery and
argument which are not directed to the merits, that is, so-called “jury
appeal” issues. To be sure, lawyers will still believe that judges can be
affected by these things, and will paint the other side as evil, malingering, a
giant uncaring company, greedy, obstructionist and so on, but there is less
of this when they know a bench trial is in the offing. Thus the number of
outlier issues pursued by the parties is reduced. In any event, lawyers will
still make good faith and important arguments on the credibility of
witnesses or the plausibility of a position.
Pre-trial preparation is less complex for bench trials, specifically
because bench trials are less complex than jury trials.
The most significant advantage of the bench trial in complex cases is
that the parties can find their way as they go. Bench trials may be far
superior where legal issues are novel, admissibility is uncertain, and a fairly
wide variety of evidence may be relevant, or not, depending on some
difficult, ultimate decisions by the judge. In jury trials most of these
decisions must be made in advance: The jury instructions, jury verdicts,
131. I emphasize: from a management perspective. Parties have perfectly good reasons
for insisting on the right to a jury, complexities or no, and I suggest no position on the
competence of juries to address complex issues and reach a reasonable result. See note 135.
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and so on, must be attended to before the jury is about to be instructed, that
is, before the evidence has all come in and been absorbed. To avoid the
shock wave effect many judges want at least substantial settlement of these
issues before the trial even starts. For example, where there is a reasonable
argument that the expert should not testify at all, a judge faced with a jury
trial may have to schedule a pretrial hearing, listing to testimony perhaps
for days132 in order to rule on the admissibility of the expert’s testimony—
and if it is admissible, the expert will then have to testify all over again.
In jury trials, evidentiary ruling have to be made on the spot, perhaps
before it is clear which theory governs liability or exactly what the scope of
that theory is. Bench trials provide the luxury of admitting substantial
amounts of evidence (e.g. exhibits and depositions) prophylactically as it
were, without taking up much court time, which may after reflection be
discounted or ignored by the judge given a certain decision on the law; but
all of which are still part of the record and so can be shown to the court of
appeal.
As a result of all these factors, preparation for a bench trial is less
complex and time consuming than for a jury trial.
Bench trials can be scheduled for non-consecutive days: this can allow
a much, much earlier trial than if a jury were required; indeed, in a busy
single assignment court, this can make over a year’s difference. Because
the very same case will cost significantly more when litigated over a period
of e.g. 3 years than 2 years, advancing trials like this will always save
money.
Many useful pretrial management techniques, which effectively group
parties into collectives, are not available at a jury trial. During pre-trial, the
court can appoint or accept liaison counsel and steering committees, require
or allow parties to simply join in motions (or limit oral argument) when
they have nothing unique to add, require joint submissions of e.g. case
management conference statements and other papers, and so on. In the
event of jury trials specifically, much of this flexibility disappears. In jury
trials, the time for and complexity of many procedures rises as a function of
the number of parties. For example, each party may have its own
witnesses, each party has a right to ask questions of every witness, to ask
questions at voir dire, to make an opening and a closing, to be heard on
most legal issues including every juror bias issue, evidentiary ruling, jury
instruction, special verdict form, and so on. The number of preemptory
132. See Sargon Enters., Inc. v. Univ. of S. Cal., 288 P.3d 1237 (Cal. 2012) (holding
eight days of pretrial hearings). See generally, Curtis Karnow, Sargon and the Science of
Reliable
Experts, 22.1
ABTL
REPORT
1
(2013),
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1012&context=curtis_karnow,
archived at http://perma.cc/U9SJ-DG98(discussing the admission of expert testimony).
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challenges also usually rises as the number of parties rise, but is capped by
the number of “sides” at trial.133 To be sure, parties still have some of these
rights in a bench trial, such as opening, closing, and asking questions of
witnesses, but because lawyers are properly content to have much of the
evidence in paper format, as opposed to the real-time oral presentations
required at a jury trial, these rights are not so often invoked: In a bench
trial, the bulk of opening and closing is done with trial and post-trial briefs
and witnesses can be presented through deposition extracts and having
direct testimony by way of declarations, reserving the right to live cross
examination. Certainly motions in limine can be filed in both sorts of
trials, but they are not usually useful, and sometimes utterly pointless, in a
bench trial.134
Think of it this way. The jury trial is the ultimate shock wave. Every
single bit of evidence has to be assembled and ready to go, generally
delivered orally (no matter how scriptory or complicated the evidence is).135

133. This is one of the few techniques judges do have at trial to collect parties into
larger categories: many or all defendants, for example, may be on the same “side” and so
may have to jointly exercise one set of peremptory challenges. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE §
231(c) (West 2015).
134. Because the proper purpose of these motions is to ensure the jury is not exposed to
inadmissible evidence, they are of less use for bench trials. See Edwards v. Centex Real
Estate Corp., 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 518, 529 (Ct. App. 1997) (“The purpose of a motion in limine
is ‘to avoid the obviously futile attempt to “unring the bell” in the event a motion to strike is
granted in the proceedings before the jury.’” (emphasis added) (quoting Hyatt v. Sierra Boat
Co., 145 Cal. Rptr. 47, 59 (Ct. App. 1978))). Some judges believe these sorts of motions are
just out of place in a bench trial. E.g., John N. Sharifi, Techniques for Defense Counsel in
Criminal Bench Trials, 28 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 687 (2005); Randy Wilson, The Bench
Trial:
It
Really
Is
Different,
ADVOCATE,
Summer
2009,
http://www.justex.net/JustexDocuments/12/Articles/Bench%20Trial.pdf,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/GR5E-2PBB; Bonnie Sudderth, Limine Motions – Their Uses and
Limitations, Judge Bonnie Sudderth L. Blog on the Tex. Rules of Evidence, (July 9, 2011)
http://judgebonniesudderth.wordpress.com/tag/motion-in-limine/,
archived
at
https://perma.cc/SA7N-UH74 (explaining in limine motions should not be filed in a bench
trial). It is pointless to file in limine motions in a bench trial when the asserted problem is
prejudice under CAL. EVID. CODE § 352 (West 2015), because judges usually can be relied
on avoid the bias, and, more practically, because the same judge will be viewing the
evidence to evaluate it in the section 352 analysis anyway. Too, when the main issue is
undue consumption of time under § 352, in limine motions are pointless when either little
time is at stake, or when about the same amount of time would be expended on for example,
an Evidence Code section 402, CAL. EVID. CODE § 402 (West 2015), pretrial hearing (or
reading voluminous depositions extracts or reviewing the documents) as at trial.
135. Jury trials in complex cases present special difficulties, because juror competence
may decline as complexity rises. Matthew A. Reiber et al., The Complexity of Complexity:
An Empirical Study of Juror Competence in Civil Cases, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 929, 955-62
(2010); see also Andrew J. Wilhelm, Complex Litigation in the New Era of the iJury, 41
PEPP. L. REV. 817, 851-55 (2014) (explaining that using technology to present information
to jurors will allow jurors to understand complex cases). But see Richard C. Waites et al.,
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Misfires generally cannot be fixed. There are few recourses available after
a jury is discharged. The bench trial, even if set for the same number of
days, is far more flexible; its moving parts are not quite so closely coupled.
In the words of complexity theory, the impact of small unpredictable events
(such as a sick witness, a lost document, an unforeseen ruling on
admissibility such as that on an expert or because a theory was not clearly
pled in a complaint or as an affirmative defense) is likely to be far greater
in a jury than a bench trial. A ferocious amount of pretrial work is needed
to account for the contingencies of jury trials, some of it just because a jury
is involved.
VII.

CONCLUSION: THE PROBABLE CASE

Every settlement judge and mediator has had this moment. A lawyer
or party is expressing a firm conviction that he will prevail, and prevail
utterly, obliterating the other side. The defendant will destroy the plaintiff
and present a costs bill of half a million dollars. Or the plaintiff will win
millions in pain and suffering, plus enormous punitive damages. There
may be good tactical reasons for taking this approach in a settlement
conference, such as trying to modify the other side’s expectations,
anchoring the discussions, manifesting resolve, and so on. But some
actually believe the extreme positions they articulate,136 and that’s where
the negotiations break down. These folks are fixed on a possible outcome.
Their forecast may indeed be possible, but because it is not probable it fails
to move the case along, and communication with the other side is
threatened.
Remotely possible positions are outliers; as with the lottery effect,
they are a bad basis on which to pursue a case.
Complex litigation tends towards what I term the possible case. I have
described the incentives, motivations, and power of parties in these cases to
pursue outlier issues, and indeed the techniques used by judges that
sometimes enable this. Parties want every last email and every deposition.
They may be able to afford the one-in-a-million long shot. They must
make every argument. From the perspective of each individual actor—the
lawyers, the parties, perhaps the insurers, many (perhaps all) of the

Are Jurors Equipped to Decide the Outcome of Complex Cases?, 29 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC.
19, 44 (2005) (discussing how trial lawyers can help jurors understand complex issues).
These concerns suggest a variety of techniques should be used at trial to help the jury.
136. Daniel
Kahneman
et
al.,
Hawkish
Bias,
(2009)
http://www.princeton.edu/~kahneman/docs/Publications/Hawkish%20Biases.pdf, archived
at http://perma.cc/B7K3-E4AG (reprinted in AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE POLITICS
OF FEAR 76-96 (A. Trevor Thrall et al. eds. 1st ed. 2009)).
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witnesses including hired experts and others with a stake in the outcome—
these may well be rational positions. The more complex the case, the more
acute the intuitions that: (i) much is uncertain and (ii) some shift, perhaps
some further iota of information, might influence the outcome. And it
might.
But this approach never reaches an EIP—the early (short of trial)
inflection point for serious settlement discussions—because the parties
never reach a perfect case. There is always, always, money left on the
table. When every possible avenue is pursued, only a trial can terminate
the case, and not even that because there is always the appeal. Managing
such a case to settlement is doomed.
To counter this dysfunction, judges must direct the parties away from
the possible case to the probable case. We ask, rhetorically, what are likely
to be the decisive issues, the key documents and witnesses, the core
depositions? Judges try to move as directly as possible to those issues, and
detours are not justified just because the parties can afford them or indeed
just because they agree to them.
Judicial intervention is guided, I think, by a variant of the rule
popularized by Carl Sagan, to the effect that “extraordinary claims require
extraordinary evidence.” I need little to convince you I have a white cat
named Lilly; I need much more to have you believe I also raise zebras. So
too with outlier issues: The less likely the task is to make a difference to the
case, the greater the resistance of the court to spend time on it and the
greater the showing required that the court and parties should spend
resources on it.
But this is just a default, and as with all defaults it must sometimes be
thrown overboard. The next case may involve new technologies, new
economic relationships, the first application of a statute; and an “outlier”
might herald an important new area of law.

